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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Classification of Behavior Disorders
Classification is a necessary first step in the develop-
ment of any science. Without it, the interrelationsnips of
empirical events go unrecognized. The process of classifi-
cation, however, can be extremely difficult. One of zhe
principal reasons for this is that the methods or dimensions
by which events are to be classified are not easily identi-
fied, and when they are, their nosological utility is often
the subject of heated disagreement.
In the fields of clinical psychology and psychiatry
the problems of classification have been especially evident.
In these areas classification has proceeded mainly as an
attempt to emulate and apply the well accepted framework of
the medical model to behavior disorders. Consistent with
medical objectives, the purpose of classification or
diagnosis has been conceptualized as representing an
initial step in tne determination of etiology, as a pre-
dictor of outcome and prognosis, and as an indicator of
appropriate treatm.ent. Voluminous criticism has been
directed against the validity of this "disease model"
system of nosology (Ullman & K.rasner, 1965), but lest a
2potentially valuable system be abandoned prematurely, it
is important that dissatisfaction bred by impatience not
be confused with invalidity. The subtleties and complex-
ities of human behavior are such that it would be unreal-
istic to expect a meaningful nosology to develop without a
long and intense expenditure of effort.
The reliability as well as validity of psychiatric
nosology also has been criticized (Maher, 1966; Nathan,
1967)
.
On the basis of a review of relevant research,
Eysenck (1960) concluded that the correlations of diagnoses
made independently by different psychiatrists were too low
to be acceptable as descriptive statements of the patients
who were being examined. Eysenck went on to state that
this was in no small part due to the low reliability of
the ratings made of the symptoms which entered into the
various syndromes.
If one thing is clear, it is that there is a good
deal of dissatisfaction with the present system of psychi-
atric nosology. Some critics go so far to question the
fundamental need for psychiatric classification; and
though their objections do have some validity, there are
counterarguments. One frequently voiced objection (Maher,
1966; Zigler & Phillips, 1961) is that no two class members
3are exactly alike and assignment to a group ignores the
uniqueness of the members, in addition, classification
does not concern itself with process or how an individual
member of the class changes over time. The counterargu-
ment to this concern with loss of uniqueness points out
that assignment to class membership should represent a
compensatory gain in the knowledge of attributes and
correlates that go along with class membership, and that
the loss of individual characteristics is minimized if
only irrelevant aspects are deleted from the classification
schema. What is relevant, however, and what is irrelevant
is not always easily determined.
Another common criticism of diagnosis is that diag-
nostic classes encompass heterogeneous groups of people
varying in symptoraology, prognosis, etiology, etc. This
criticism fails to realize that considered within a class-
ification system is the notion of a broad group which
includes subgroups. For exam.ple, schizophrenia may be
considered the main group with the various forms of schiz-
ophrenia considered as subgroups, in which case the con-
cept schizophrenia could not be criticized on the basis
that all its m.embers do not share all attributes, although
obviously they share sorre attributes.
4Accepting then, in principle at least, the potential
value of psychiatric classification, a pertinent ques-
tion would be to ask how the present system could be
improved. Some thoughts on this question have been pre-
sented by Zigler & Phillips (1961) and, because of their
clarity, they are quoted here:
The amount of descriptive effort required
before etiological factors are likely to be dis-
covered has been underestimated and the pursuit
of etiology should represent an end point rather
than a beginning for classificatory systems.
The process of moving from an em.pirical
orientation to an etiological one is of
necessity inferential and therefore susceptible
to the myriad dangers of premature inference.
We propose that the greatest safeguard against
such prematurity is not to be found in the
scrapping of an empirical descriptive approach,
but in an accelerated program of empirical
research. What is needed at this time is a
systematic, empirical attack on the problemi
of mental disorders. Inherent in this program
is the employm.ent of symptoms broadly defined
as meaningful and discernible behaviors as the
basis of a classif icatory system [p. 616]
.
Zigler stresses the need for more active research
focusing on the descriptive aspects of mental disorders.
If diagnosis is to be useful, its descriptive referents
must be less vague and inconsistent than at present. This
study has been designed, in part, to deal with Zigler 's
comments, its intention being to focus on the behavior
5disorder sociopathic personality and to examine experi-
itentally the validity of several of its descriptive
criteria. At the same time, it is the intent of the
stiidy to provide more substantive knowledge about these
criteria, and thereby to go beyond the one-dimensionality
of the brief statements generally used to characterize
this disorder.
History of Sociooathy
In order that the reader may better understand the
present form of the concept of sociopathy, the developir^nt
of the concept is traced in this section. It will help at
the outset, to avoid confusion, to make it clear how the
concept is currently described. The most recent psychia-
tric nomenclature (American Psychiatric Association, 1968)
has adopted the nam.e antisocial personality to describe
what in this paper has been called sociopathic personality,
Because of the tenacious popularity of the term.s psycho-
path and sociopath they are used here interchangeably with
antisocial personality. The following description is from
the diagnostic manual:
This term anti-social personality is reserved
for individuals v;ho are basically unsocialized
and whose behavior pattern brings them re-
peatedly into conflict v;ith society. They are
incapable of significant loyalty to individuals.
groups, or social values. They are grossly
selfish, callous, irresponsible, impulsive^
and unable to feel guilt or to learn frora
experience and punishment. Frustration
tolerance is low. They tend to blame others
or offer plausible rationalizations for their
behavior. A mere history of repeated social
offenses is not sufficient to justify this
diagnosis [p. 43],
The first clinical description of the sociopath comes
to us from the observations of Pinel (Kavka, 1949) who
described the unusual behavior of a young aristocrat who
was prone to extreme fits of anger. If a dog, or horse, or
other animal offended him he would instantly put it to death.
At one time he became so enraged at a woman that he threw
her into a ^A;ell. Pinel gives us som.e background informiation,
telling us that this young man was the son of a weak and
indulgent mother who encouraged the gratification of her
son's every caprice and desire. He referred to the condition
exhibited by this young man as "Manie Sans Delire": "I was
not a little surprised to find many maniacs who at no
period gave evidence of any lesion of the understanding, but
who were under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury,
as if the active faculties alone sustained the injury
[p. 462]
By today's standards, Pinel' s "Manie Sans Delire" is
too inclusive, lurr.ping together several psychiatric
7categories. His classic exairple cited above would probably
be more accurately described as an acting-out neurotic.
His observations, however, served as an important step in
the direction of considering the psychopathic state as a
separate mental disorder.
In England in 1635, J. C. Prit chard coined the phrase
"moral insanity" to describe an individual who "is found
to be incapable not of reasoning upon any subject proposed
to him but of conducting himself with decency and propriety
in the business of life [McCord & McCord, 1964, p. 24]."
Pritchard's concept, like Pinel's, was overly inclusive
compared to the contemporary picture of the sociopath,
including such disorders as manic-depressive psychosis
under his label "moral insanity." It was Pritchard's con-
cept of moral insanity that was the precursor of the concept
of social or moral defectives, or moral imbeciles, developed
in the later work of British writers.
In 1378 Gouster (iMcCord & McCord, 1964) presented the
first clinical picture of the symptoms found in moral in-
sanity: longstanding moral perversion; a delight in mis-
chief, excitement, and passion; enfeebled judgment; and
certain abnormal physical proportions. Only these last two
points would seem to be in disagreement with the present-day
8conceptualization.
By the 1870 's Pritchard's concept of moral insanity
had become increasingly popular and controversial (Maughs,
1941)
.
Its supporters contended that a separate moral
sense existed within the mind which could be split into
intellectual and moral spheres, and still others felt that
the intellect was always affected in mental illness and
therefore insanity could not exist without som.e intellectual
impairment
.
The inevitable entanglement of the concept of socio-
pathy with legal and religious questions postponed its pro-
gress towards being considered a separate entity until the
turn of the century when interest shifted away from theore-
tical considerations to observations of the sociopath him-
self. In America, the term moral insanity was replaced by
"psychopathic inferiority" suggested by Koch in 1888
(Partridge, 1930) . Koch implied that the disorder was
caused by a constitutional predisposition; and, in time,
constitutional psychopathy gained wide use. In England,
things took a slightly different turn. The concept of
moral insanity served as a point of departure, with the
theoretical conflicts previously associated with the term
being relatively ignored. As reported in Partridge's
9review (1930)
,
Tregold spoke of an inner defect of moral
sense and wisdom with strong antisocial tendencies.
Sullivan viewed the conduct of the moral im.becile as
patently absurd, "he lacks the essential quality of common
sense. The moral imbecile is apt to engage in -./rong doing
for pleasure rather than profit, is usually an incorrigible
thief and liar, and is apt to show early in life a many
sided perversity of disposition. In all cases there is a
common trait of insensibility with respect to the rt.oral
quality involved, with consequent incapacity for expressing
shame or remorse [Partridge, 1930. p. 67]." Sullivan's
description is much like present conceptions of the socio-
path .
The concept of sociopathy has had a long history of
confusion surrounding its development. This confusion has
come not only from the inadequate delimiting of the
behavioral phenomenon in question, but also from the
plethora of term.s and subtypes that have been used at one
time or another to refer to the sociopath. A number of
attempts have been m.ade to divide the classification of
sociopathy into subgroups, but rather than clarifying the
concept, they have only helped to befuddle the issue, since
these attempts based their subgrouping primarily on arbitrary
10
and superficial distinctions. A few of the niany systerv.s
are given below:
Kraepelin Schneider Partridge(McCord & McCord, 1964) (McCord & McCord, 1964) (193Q)
1. the excitable ^. ^ne nyperthyinic l. delinquent
2. the unstable 2. the depressed 2. inadequateJ. -cne impulsive 3. the
4. the eccentric
5. the liars and
swindlers
6. the antisocial
7. the quarrelsoir.e
1 th h r
insecure
4. the fanatic
5. the se If-seeking
6. the emotionally
unstable
7. the exploitative
8. the affect less
9. the weak-willed
10. the asthenic
3
. those with
general
incompat-
ibility
As recently as 1942, Henderson (1942) identified three
types: (1) predominantly aggressive, (2) predominantly in-
adequate, and (3) predominantly creative. Though his tri-
partite division contributed little, Henderson's description
of the psychopath is generally consistent with more recant
formulations. He described him as an individual who has
remained at an imanature, egocentric level, and who lacks
persistence of effort and is unable to profit from exper-
ience. One notable disagreement with the contemporary pic-
ture of the psychopath is Henderson's statem.ent that,
"Their conduct throughout their lives has been punctuated
by disturbing episodes which have given rise to great
anxiety [p. 466]." This is not consistent with the picture
11
of the psychopath as guiltless, affectless, and devoid of
remorse
,
Contributing to the general perplexity surrounding the
concept of psychopathy has been the over inclusiveness of
the concept. For example, Kahn (1931), whose book
Psychopathic Personality was for more than a decade re-
garded as the chief exposition on the subject, listed six-
teen types of psychopaths. The disorders included in
Kahn's book included all the familiar psychoneurotic
reactions as well as a variety of other behavior dis-
orders, and, ironically, little can be found in this book
which relates to the psychopath himself.
Ever since the concept of psychopathy was first des-
cribed by Pinel, it has had the uncanny quality of being
called by different names. In his historical review.
Partridge (1930) identified approximately a dozen terms
more or less synonoraous in their use. They include con-
stitutional inferior, constitutional psychopathic person-
ality, psychopath, constitutional psychopath, constitutional
psychopathic state, moral imbecile, constitutional defective,
defective delinquents, emotionally unstable or inferior,
neurotic constitution, and instinct character. In his
review of psychopathy, Maughs (1941) was able to come up
12
with seventeen terins, including son^thing called a psycho-
satipath
.
With all the confusion surrounding the concept of
sociopathy, it is not surprising that an occasional author
has suggested that the concept be done away with. One
psychiatrist wrote, "The term psychopathic personality as
commonly understood is useless in psychiatric research.
It does not refer to a specific behavioral entity. It
serves as a scrap-basket to which is relegated a group of
otherwise unclassified personality disorders and problems
[In McCord & McCord, 1964, p. 29]." Kinbeirg says the same
thing a little more strongly, "The concept should be
abrogated as theoretically unsatisfactory, practically
misleading and destructive to scientific thinking [McCord &
McCord, 1964, p. 2],"
Through the clouding confusion and disagreerrent the
concept of sociopathy hung on, and by the early 1900 's
observers had begun to refine and delimit the concept. In
1906, Meyer excluded hysteria, psychasthenia, and neuras-
thenia from the concept (Partridge, 1930) . Birnbauro (1917)
pointed out that criminal behavior per se was not psycho-
pathic, nor did psychopaths necessarily exhibit intellectual
defects. By the end of World War I, the consensus was that
13
psychopathy was a discrete disorder inanifested by strong
criminal tendencies apparently not deterred by punishment.
By the 1930s the term "constitutional inferior"
seemed to be falling into disrepute as being too ambiguous,
too comprehensive, and too indefinite regarding the
boundaries between abnormal and normal. Not to be undone
by his predecessors, Partridge (1930) offered his own
contribution to the names that had already amassed around
the concept of psychopathy. He coined the terms "essential
sociopath" and "sociopath." Partridge indicated that
schemas of the psychopath at that time placed him in a
coordinate position with the mental deficiencies, and that
psychopathy as it was being used in its more inclusive
sense referred to deep and chronic malad justm.ent
. The
principal characteristic of Partridge's "essential socio-
path" is persistent and consistent antisocial behavior
which is extremely resistant to change. Partridge went
on to propose that the sociopath appears in two varieties:
as the antisocial personality par excellence, and as a
member of a great class of socially deviated persons who
do not manifest any major personality deficiency.
A challenge to the concept of psychopathy that began
in 1930 and which, to an abated degree, has continued to
14
the present is the question of the presence of intrapsychic
conflicts (Jenkins, 1960). In 1930, Franz Alexander pre-
sented his classic paper on the neurotic character in
which he relegated the concept of psychopathy to the sub-
ordinate position of one among many neuroses. As such,
the psychopath's behavior was understood in terms of the
interplay of id, ego, and superego (Alexander, 1930).
According to Alexander, the seeming guiltlessness of the
psychopath's behavior is only apparent. On an uncon-
scious level, the psychopath is seeking self punishment
(Gurvitz, 1951). Alexander's position maintains that the
psychopath lives out his impulses, and that the strength
of his ego is less than other neurotics principally be-
cause of the overwhelming power of his impulses.
Though most social scientists today believe that
Alexander's theory depicts the personality of the acting
out neurotic rather than the true psychopath (McCord &
McCord, 1964) , his position has not been without its
supporters. After studying the cases of fifty psycho-
paths. Partridge (1928) concluded that the psychopath is
one in whom strong dem.ands are accompanied by feelings of
inadequacy, inferiority and insecurity. Bromberg (1948)
argued that the dynamic psychopathoLogy of the so-called
15
psychopath is siinilar to. if not identical with, the basic
defects in the structure of the ego found in the neurotic
character. For Broxnberg the defenses considered to be
used by the psychopathic character
-vvere the same as those
in other neuroses. He felt that the presence of anxiety,
guilt, repression, and substitute gratification made it
difficult to view psychopathy as dynamically dissimilar
from symptoir.at ic neurosis.
Karpman (1943a, 1948b) made a significant contribu-
tion in elucidating the thinking concerning the presence
of conflict in psychopathy when he divided' the disorder
into two subtypes: symptomatic (secondary) and idiopathic
(primary) psychopathy. In the symptomatic group Karpman
included those cases which, on intensive study, demonstrated
that there was an underlying psychic disturbance responsible
for the appearance of psychopathic behavior. The neurotic
character discussed by Alexander would be included in this
group. When all the cases which Karpman was able to place
in his first group were taken care of there still remained
a small group designated as primary psychopaths, in whom
no sign of psychogenesis could be found, 'No matter how
much effort one may make. It just isn't there [Karpman,
1948b. p. 5 2711"
A pervasive difficulty with the concept of psycho-
pathy has been the failure to define the concept in terms
of a consistent set of criteria. Least guilty of this
has been Hervey Cleckley (1964), who has compiled a rela-
tively detailed and extensive list of descriptive criteria.
Cleckley' s efforts have had great practical value in
helping to clarify what is rceant by psychopathy. He listed
sixteen points [p. 363]:
1. Superficial charm and good "intelligence"
2. Absence of "nervousness" or neurotic
manifestations
3. Absence of delusions and other signs of
irrational thinking
4. Unreliability
5. Untruthfulness and insincerity
6. Lack of remorse or shame
7. Inadequately motivated antisocial behavior
8. Poor judgment and failure to learn by
experience
9. Pathological egocentricity and incapacity
for love
10. General poverty in major affective reactions
11. Sf^cific loss of insight
12. Unresponsiveness in general interpersonal
relationships
13. Fantastic and uninviting behavior with
drink and sometimes without
14. Suicide rarely carried out
15. Sex life im.personal, trivial and poorly
integrated
16. Failure to follow any life plan
As previous writers had done, Cleckley emphasized the
traditional traits of guiltlessness, incapacity for object
love, shallowness of emoticr, and impulsivity. In addition,
17
he Introduced some new observations on the psychopath's
superficial charm by which he often conceals his asociaiity,
Surprisingly, Cleckley also noted that psychopaths can be
found not only in prisons but in the respected positions
of physicians, scientists, or even psychiatrists.
Cleckley s efforts are not without some shortcomings.
Even a cursory look at his list reveals that his sixteen
criteria are not discrete and independent, there being a
fair degree of overlap and repetition. It is also not
specified how much relative weight is to be given to the
various criteria.
As phrased, not all of Cleckley' s criteria readily
lend themselves to objective validation. Among the six-
teen listed, the two that have been selected for study
here are "egocentricity and incapacity for love" and
"failure to follow any life plan." For the latter
criterion, some license has been taken in the present
study in reconceptualizing it as inability to delay grati-
fication. This is not felt to be a violation of the basic
description when one considers Cleckley' s (1964) statement,
"He [the psychopath] does not maintain an effort toward
any far goal at all, [p. 400]." Or McCord McCords'
(1964) statement that, "His life [the psychopath's] is
18
dominated by fleeting desires which leave no space for
farsighted planning [p. 10]."
Research on Sociopathy
Until Lykken (1955, 1957) presented his work on
anxiety in the sociopathic personality, nothing had been
done experimentally to validate the purported character-
istics of the sociopath. Lykken addressed himself speci-
fically to the sociopath's alleged lack of affective
arousal and recalcitrance to attempts at modification of
his antisocial behavior.
Though Lykken 's work and most studies "that have
followed it have focused on aspects of behavior—avoidance
learning and anxiety in the sociopath—which are not the
specific interest of the present research, a brief summary
of this work will be given in order that the reader may
be made familiar with the direction and form that research
has taken. Starting from Cleckley's clinical observations,
Lykken formulated several experimental hypotheses: a)
sociopaths would be clearly defective compared to normals
in their ability to develop or condition anxiety, defined
as an anticipatory emotional response to warning signals
previously associated with noxious stim.ulation, b) socio-
paths would exhibit little manifest anxiety in life
19
Situations normally conducive to this response, and c)
sociopaths would be relatively incapable of avoidance
learning under those conditions where anxiety would med-
iate the learning of an avoidance response.
Lykken's task was a 20 choice point irental maze
which the subject was given 20 trials to master (the
manifest task)
.
At each choice point the subject could
choose among any one of four alternative responses, one
correct and three incorrect. Of the three error alter-
natives, only one would result in the receiving of shock.
The "latent task" was for the subject to avoid receiving
shocks, i.e., to learn to be incorrect on the non-shocked
alternatives. Presumably, performance on the manifest
task would be reinforced by social and ego rewards and
performance on the latent task, by anxiety reduction.
The measure of anxiety conditionability was taken
independent of the maze learning task, in a classical
conditioning situation using GSR as the dependent vari-
able. Subjects sat blindfolded listening to two buzzers,
only one of which was paired with shock. The second
buzzer, of different tone, was used to test for general-
ization effects.
Lykken used three groups in his experiir.ent : primary
20
sociopaths, neurotic sociopaths, and normals. The dis-
tinction betwean the primary and neurotic sociopath was
made on the basis of the presence of conflict and manifest
anxiety, primary sociopathy being indicated by low levels
of anxiety on the Taylor, Lykken, and Welsh anxiety in-
dices. The distinction that Lykken made was consistent
with Karpraan's primary and secondary psychopath.
Lykken' s major hypotheses 'vvere confirm.ed: a) there
was no difference between the groups in learning the mani-
fest task, b) the primary sociopaths showed significantly
less avoidance learning on the latent task than normals,
with the neurotics falling about midway between these two
groups, and c) the primary sociopaths showed significantly
less GSR reactivity and conditioning than the normals, with
the neurotic sociopaths giving GSR data almost identical to
those of the primary sociopaths.
Results for the basal skin conductance (BSC) measures
among the three groups were equivocal. The data for the
normals suggested lower BSC than for the sociopaths, but
Lykken postulated that this m.ay have been an artifact of
the condition that his sociopaths and controls were run
through the experimental procedure at different seasons
of the year. Purportedly, skin conductance is affected
21
by seasonal changes.
Lykken's study indicated that the sociopath does not
have a general learning deficit, but, more specifically,
a deficit in a particular form of anxiety mediated avoid-
ance learning. Support for the notion that the sociopath
is not impaired in his general learning ability comes from
the research of Bernard & Eisennan (1967) and Persons &
Bruning (1966). In fact, both these studies found learn-
ing in the sociopath to be equal to, if not better than,
learning in normals. Persons & Bruning (1966) instructed
male incarcerated sociopaths, incarcerated non-sociopaths
and normals to draw three-inch lines. Knowledge of
results was given verbally by the statements "too long"
and "too short," and by a mild shock for incorrect answers.
The investigators found that the sociopaths demonstrated
the most rapid acquisition and greatest resistance to
extinction. Bernard & Eisenman (1967), using female
sociopaths and student nurses, employed a verbal condi-
tioning task in which pronouns were reinforced in a sen-
tence-construction task. Two types of positive reinforcers
were used, "good" as social reward and nickels as monetary
reward. The investigators found that the sociopaths
showed significantly ir.ore frequent er?.ission of the
reinforced pronoun and that social reward was it^ore effec-
tive than monetary reward for both groups.
Partial support for Lykken's finding of lowered
autonomic reactivity in the sociopath can also be found.
Hare (1965) monitored skin conductance of psychopathic
and non-psychopathic criminals and non-criminal controls
while they watched the numbers one through twelve con-
secutively presented on a memory drum. Subjects were pre-
viously told that the number eight would be accompanied
by a shock. The results showed that as shock approached,
anticipatory arousal, as measured by the increases in log
conductance in the interval prior to shock, began later
and were smaller for the psychopathic than for the non-
psychopathic subjects. No significant differences,
however, were found between psychopaths and controls for
responsiveness to shock or recovery from the effects of
the shock.
Fox and Lippert (1963) used juvenile offenders diag-
nosed personality pattern disturbance. They monitored
spontaneous GSR activity and basal skin conductance while
their subjects were instructed to relax on a couch in a
low ambient noise level room. The researchers found that
the personality disturbance group exhibited the greatest
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frequency of spontaneous activity, but no significant
difference between groups was found in basal skin con-
ductance.
A position directly opposed to Lykken's and Cleckley's
is that of Schacter and Latane (1964) who argue that the
sociopath is inore autonomically responsive than the normal,
and that their apparently low manifest anxiety is a func-
tion of a labeling, or cognitive, factor. Their arguments
are based, in part, upon research (Schacter & Singer, 1962)
Which demonstrated that a state of chemically induced
physiological arousal was experienced differently depending
upon the experim.ental conditions. Those subjects who were
told what to expect, i.e., the physiological effects of
epinephrine, the drug used, did not report anger or
euphoria as did the non-informed subjects. Schacter and
Latane interpret this experiment to mean that both physio-
logical and cognitive components are required for exper-
iencing an emotion.
In a further experiment intended to clarify the re-
lationship between epinephrine, sociopathy, and avoidance
learning, Schacter and Latane (1964) repeated Lykken's
original study but with one addition. Each subject was
tested tv;o tinges, once with an injection of placebo and
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once with epinephrine. As expected, under the placebo
condition Lykken's original findings vvere replicated.
Unexpectedly, hovrever, under the epinephrine condition
the sociopaths' perforir^ance on the avoidance task sur-
passed the performance of the normals. To help explain
this finding, Schacter and Latane appealed to a com-
panion study in which pre- and post-injection pulse rates
were taken for sociopaths and normals. In that study,
pre-injection pulse rates were found to be somewhat
higher for sociopaths, and after injection, the differ-
ences favoring the sociopath were even greater. Schacter
and Latane 's use of pulse rate rather than GSR intro-
duced the controversial issue of what measure, or mea-
sures, of autonomic functioning are best representative
of arousal. Without attempting to answer this question,
they took their findings of greater pulse rate and
epinephrine sensitivity in the Lykken situation tc support
the thesis that the sociopath is more, not less, auton-
omically responsive than the normal. They further spec-
ulated that the sociopath's reactivity is indiscriminately
high, almost any event eliciting strong autonomic respon-
ses. In terms of internal cures, it follows that socio-
paths will feel little differences during times of danger
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or during n^ore tranquil tiines. it is only under highly
unusual circumstances of stimulation that the sociopath
is able to feel, i.e., to discriminate or label his emo-
tional state.
Because those conditions which, for others, would be
associated with emotionality are, for the sociopath his
normal state, the sociopath might be expected to be
reckless and to seek out situations that would allow him
to experience emotion. Observations of the sociopath's
thrill seeking and reckless behavior would seem to
support this. The same behavior, however, can also be
seen as the pathological seeking of stimulation arising
from the sociopath's lowered reactivity.
Quay (1965) interprets much of the psychopath's
antisocial behavior as pathological seeking of stimula-
tion. He has argued that while the evidence for lowered
basal activity is equivocal, the GSR studies almost uni-
formly indicate a more rapid adaptation process. Because
of their lowered basal activity or rapid adaptation,
according to Quay, psychopaths are often in a situation
of stimulus deprivation and are thereby motivated by this
unpleasant condition to change their affective state.
An illuiTiinat ing study, clarifying and providing
fresh insights into the relationship of anxiety and avoid-
ance learning in sociopaths, has been reported by Schmauk
(1967, 1970). Schrnauk's research is primarily a repli-
cation of Lykken's, with several modifications and
additions. The major important modifications were the
monitoring of GSR activity during the learning of the
mental maze; the inclusion of three different types of
punishment: shock, loss of money, and social punishirent
(the word wrong)
; the operational definition of autonmic
anticipation and autonomic reactivity; and the assess-
ment of the subjective experience of anxiety.
Schrnauk's findings agreed with Lykken's for the
learning of the manifest task but not for the learning of
the latent task. Schmauk found that under the tangible
punishment condition (loss of money)
,
primary sociopaths
learned to avoid as well as normals, but under the other
two punishment conditions, normals' performance in
learning to avoid v;as superior to that of the sociopaths' .
Schmauk found no significant difference between his groups
in basal skin conductance or in autonomic reactivity. An
important finding was a groups by punishment interaction
for the autonomic anticipation score (skin conductance
changes in the five-second interval during which the
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subject chose a lever)
. Under the tangible punishrDent
condition, autonomic anticipation was about equal for the
two groups, but under the other two punishment conditions
the normals had greater anticipation scores, in addition
primary sociopaths reported greater subjective anxiety
under the tangible punishm.ent condition.
On the basis of Schmauk's (1967, 1970) findings, it
would appear that the popular notion that sociopaths are
deficient in avoidance learning should be qualified to
state that they are deficient in their responsiveness to
particular kinds of punishments. Find the appropriate
stimuli, and their autonomic responsivity
, their sub-
jective experience of anxiety, and their ability to learn
to avoid are equal to that of normals.
Based on the findings of Schmauk and others (Lykken,
1957; Schacter & Latane, 1964), the putatively low
autonomic reactivity of sociopaths has not been clearly
substantiated. The only reliable finding cutting across
a large number of studies (Hare, 1965; Lykken, 1957;
Schacter & Latane, 1964; Schmauk, 1970) is that socio-
paths condition fear m.ore poorly than do normals, and
that their autonomic anticipation of aversive stimuli is
generally less.
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A recent study which also employed GSR in sociopaths
as one of its primary dependent measures is of special
interest, not so much for any light it sheds on the ques-
tion of autonomic reactivity in sociopaths, but for its
directing of investigative attention to the study of the
interpersonal egocentricity and insensit ivity of sociopaths,
one of the major criteria of concern to this study. Sutker
(1970) used a vicarious conditioning paradigm to test her
hypothesis that sociopaths have little sensitivity to the
feelings of others. Basic to her procedure was the recog-
nized phenomenon that emotional responses of one individual
may elicit similar or dissimilar responses in another in-
dividual. Sutker cited evidence that one person observing
another person receiving shocks can com-e to evince a con-
ditioned GSR to the impending shock. Given this research
finding, Sutker theorized that sociopaths, with their re-
duced sensitivity to others, should exhibit less condi-
tionability than normal subjects of a vicarious autonomic
emotional response while observing shock delivered to
another individual (in this instance a stooge of the ex-
perimenter) . Sutker also hypothesized, as a second mea-
sure of the sociopaths' insensitivity , that sociopaths
would relinquish fewer quarters, given to them prior to
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the experi,.ent, when the relinquishment of quarters would
serve to prevent the other from receiving shocks. No
other renumeration was involved beyond the packet of
quarters.
Subjects for Sutker's study were all males, twelve
psychology students and twelve volunteer sociopaths whose
names had been obtained from several mental health agen-
cies. After being wired to monitoring equipment, subjects
were told to sit quietly and listen to the presentation of
the numbers one through seven. They were told that after
the number four the other subject would receive a shock.
There were two pre-conditioning trials and six condition-
ing trials. After the first six conditioning trials, six
more trials followed, with the subject given the option of
placing one of his six quarters in a box after the num.ber
two was called, in order to prevent the other subject from
receiving shock.
Sutker found no differences between sociopaths and
non-sociopaths in BSC, which is in line with previous
literature (Fox and Lippert, 1963; Schmauk, 197C)
. Con-
trary to prediction, Sutker found that sociopaths responded
v;ith significantly greater GSR conductance changes to all
stim.uli across trials. They did not, hov-ever, show any
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significant difference in response to the nuinber three
betv;een pre-conditioning and conditioning trials, while
the noriT^als did, confirming previous research findings of
poorer anticipatory responding in sociopaths. On Sutker's
other measure of insensitivity, the relinquishing of
quarters, no significant differences were found between
groups.
While Sutker's findings did not support the thesis
of greater egocentricity of sociopaths, it cannot hastily
concluded that there are no differences in egocentricity
between sociopaths and normals. This is because the
scientific method, which provides the procedural founda-
tion of all research, recognizes the limitations and
fallibility of experimentation. Any experiment is sus-
ceptible to many errors which include errors in design
and procedure as v;ell as interpretation of the data. One
safeguard against the incorporation of inaccurate con-
clusions into the body of scientific information is the
expectation that experimental findings be replicated by
other researchers. When this has not occurred, the value
of the findings of any one study is considered tentative
at best. Sutker's study, being the first to examine the
hypothesis of the egocentricity or insensitivity of
31
sociopaths, should be evaluated with great care. In
addition, that Sutker's findings did not support her
hypothesis of greater insensitivity of sociopaths, raises
the question of the potency of her dependent measures.
It is conceivable that another method of measuring the
egocentricity of sociopaths would give totally different
results from those of Sutker. The present study, inves-
tigating egocentricity in sociopathy within an experi-
mental context wholely dissimilar to that employed by
Sutker, provided a valuable next step in the evaluation
of egocentricity as one of the criteria of sociopathy.
Further, because of the present investigator's agreement
with Zigler & Phillips (1961) position on the need for
more intensive research into the descriptive dimensions
of behavior disorders, two additional criteria of socio-
pathy were investigated.
Overview and Hypotheses
The three dimensions of sociopathy under consideration
in this study were egocentrism, the inability to delay
gratification, and high risk taking behavior. The first
two characteristics were drawn from the detailed descrip-
tions of the sociopath given by Cleckley (1964) and by
KcCord & McCord (1964) . The third characteristic was
extrapolated principally froin media based impressions of
the sociopath's life style, which suggested that socio-
paths, in spite of high risks of failure, are attracted
to high payoffs that require a minimum expenditure of
effort. This last characteristic of risk taking was pro-
posed with less confidence in its validity than the other
two criteria but with the hope that its inclusion would
provide additional insights into the sociopath's behavior.
Egocentrism
. Based on the literature reviewed above,
an egocentric person was understood to be an individual
who is concerned chiefly with his own desires to the ex-
clusion of those of others. He is completely absorbed in
himself, craving only his own pleasure. His attachments
to others are usually fleeting and superficial, and when
he does relate to others, it is as though they \^rere ob-
jects to be used and manipulated to further his own ends.
Cooperation, compromise, or the sacrificing of his needs
for the betterment of others are considered difficult, if
not alien, concepts for the egocentric individual to
understand
.
Considering the above description, a task which would
allow for cooperative or exploitative behavior was needed
as an experimental paradigm for egocentricity , A task
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that seemed well suited to this requirement was the
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game (Crurabaugh & Evans, 1967;
Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh & Lipetz, 1959). Briefly, this
game is structured so that two players occupying separate
cubicles are called upon to make a series of choices.
The combined choices made affect the amount of money
earned. The payoff contingencies and choices are estab-
lished in such a way that each subject has the option of
maximizing his own gain to the disadvantage of the partner
or maximizing mutual gain.
Hypothesis 1 was that sociopaths would' exhibit more
egocentricity (exploitative or uncooperative behavior)
than normals.
Inability to Delay Gratification
. Not being able to
delay gratification was defined in this study, as per
Mischel (1961) , as the preference of immediate smaller re-
inforcements over long term, larger ones. The sociopath
reputedly is motivated by whim and the immediacy of his
needs. Long term planning and time consuming considera-
tions are supposedly ignored or given minim.al thought.
If this is so, it was expected that after the PD game was
over, the sociopaths, more frequently than the normals,
would choose to take their earnings at the end of the
experiment rather than wait a week for the additional in-
centive of one extra dollar.
Hypothesis 2 was that sociopaths, as compared with
normals, would exhibit an inability to delay gratification,
as measured by a greater number of the sociopaths indica-
ting a preference for receiving their earnings immediately
after the end of the experiment.
High Risk Taking Behavior
. By the nature of his
antisocial behavior, the sociopath often gives the im-
pression that he is taking great risks in the face of a
high likelihood of being caught. Is the sociopath
attracted by high payoffs that require minimum effort
(e.g., horse betting) so much so that he ignores or min-
imizes the risks involved?
The method for measuring this characteristic came
at the end of the experiment when the sociopath earned a
fixed amount from the PD game. He was offered the chance
to multiply his earnings by spinning a dial. If he got
a "five" his earnings were multiplied, if he did not, he
lost all his money. The multiples were selected so that
chance was clearly against the sociopath's success.
Hypothesis 3 was that sociopaths, as compared with
normals, would exhibit greater risk taking behavior, i.e..
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sociopaths would go for the "quick killing" (an opportun-
ity to i^ultiply their earnings) more often than normals.
A corollary to this hypothesis was that sociopaths
would perceive the risk involved in spinning the dial as
more favorable than would normals, and this would be re-
flected in their subjective ratings of the degree of
risk.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subject Selection
Three groups of 35 subjects each participated in
this research: primary sociopaths (PSs)
, neurotic socio-
paths (NSs)
,
and normal controls (Cs)
. Primary and
neurotic sociopaths, all of whom were recidivists, were
recruited from a population of criminal offenders incar-
cerated at a large New Jersey reformatory. Inmates at
the reformatory were all males, predominantly Negro, and
ranging in age from 17 to 35. Normal controls were re-
cruited from three Philadelphia high schools varying in
the proportion of racial groups present and in the socio-
economic background of their students. One school was
atypical in that it provided a post high school technical
training program for its students. An attempt was made
to match Ss for age, race, IQ, SES, and funds available.
Funds available was determ.ined by asking Ss how much
money they had on a weekly basis from any source. For
those high school students who held jobs, the amount of
money given to their families was subtracted from their
earnings. Funds available was included among tne matching
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variables as a inethod of equating subject groups for their
subjective estimate of the value of the money incentives
that were being played for in the prisoner's dilemma game.
All groups were constituted to be approximately 70% Negro,
average in intelligence, and from lower class backgrounds.
Socioeconomic status was determined from a rating pro-
cedure which incorporates education, occupational pres-
tige, and income into one measure (Reiss, 1961)
.
All potential Ss were given, in a group situation,
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)
and the Revised Beta Examination Intelligence Test. This
was done routinely for the criminal offenders by prison
authorities. Sociopaths' were considered eligible for
selection if testing had been done within a year's time.
In a large number of instances retesting was done to ob-
tain a more currently accurate record. Any S receiving
a Beta IQ below 85 was not used, this being considered a
minimum required intelligence level to insure the S's
comprehension of the experimental procedure and instruc-
tions. On the basis of the MMPI score profiles, subjects
were assigned to one of the three groups.
The MMPI was chosen as the main selection device
for tv;o reasons. One, it is convenient, being easily
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administered, scored, and interpreted; and, two, there is
a large body of literature which supports its validity in
identifying sociopaths (Craddick, 1962; Dahlstrom & Welsh,
I960; Gilberstadt & Duker, 1965; Guthrie, 1950: Hanum,
1964; Hathaway & Monachesi, 1953; Marks & Seeraan, 1963;
Meehl, 1946; Stefanowicz, 1967).
In the present research, two groups of sociopaths
were identified. The concept of there being two groups
of sociopaths and the procedure used to identify these
groups followed from the work of several researchers.
Conceptually, the definition of sociopathy was refined
and given greater precision by Karpman (194Sa, 1948b)
when he forwarded the idea that sociopathy could be mean-
ingfully divided into two subclasses, primary and secondary,
with the separation being made on the basis of the absence
or presence of the neurotic indicants of guilt and
anxiety, respectively. Lykken (1955) adopted Karpman 's
thinking and translated it into experimental operations.
He identified primary sociopaths and neurotic sociopaths
among a prison population by using Cleckley's criteria in
check list form. Only inmates with a diagnosis of socio-
pathic personality ivere considered by Lykken 's panel of
psychologists for assignment to the primary sociopath or
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neurotic sociopath groups. Lykken also adn,inistered the
MMPI and obtained several measures of anxiety, including
the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (mas)
. Consistent with
prediction, Lykken found that his PS subjects v^re signi-
ficantly lov^er on the MAS. The MMPI profiles of the two
groups were similar, both showing elevations on tne psycno-
pathic deviate (Pd) and hypomania (Ma) scales, but with
the neurotic sociopaths' mean profile suggesting a ten-
dency to score lower on hypomania (Ma) and higher on
depression than the primary sociopaths. Guided by Lykken 's
work, Schmauk (1967) selected his primary sociopath sub-
jects to have a Pd-Ma profile on the MJ^iPI, with low de-
pression, psychasthenia, and hypochondriasis scores; and
his neurotic sociopath subjects to have a Pd-Ma profile
with depression, psychasthenia, and hypochondriasis being
higher
.
In the present research, Schmauk 's procedure for
selecting sociopathic groups (with minor variations) was
used. A large group of incarcerated Ss received the Beta
and MMPI. The complete MMPI profile, including the ten
clinical scales, the three validity scales, and the Taylor
MAS (1953), was plotted for each S^. Offenders with normal-
looking profiles (Pd and Ma below T-score 65, all other
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scales below T-score 70) or psychotic-appearing profiles
(paranoia or schizophrenia above T-score 70) were dropped
from further consideration. Subjects having a Pd-Ma
profile with low MMPI anxiety Scales (hypochondriasis,
hysteria, depression, and psychasthenia) were classified
as primary sociopaths. Those subjects showing a Pd-Ma
profile with high MMPI anxiety scores were classified
neurotic sociopaths. In order to objectify this pro-
cedure, a degree of sociopathy score was devised. This
score was simply the sum of the anxiety scale scores (see
above)
.
Dividing the sociopaths into primary and neurotic
groupings was then accomplished by using a median split on
the Total Anxiety (TA) scores, the upper half (those with
the greatest Total Anxiety scores) being assigned to the
neurotic sociopath group. Then, based on previous research
(Schmauk, 1967) which showed that neurotic sociopaths ex-
hibit higher MAS scores than primary sociopaths, any S
with an MAS score that deviated greatly from the average
of his preliminary group designation was excluded from
the study.
Finally, after the initial division of the criminal
offenders into PS and NS groups, further purification of
the groups was made by considering an additional criterion.
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Each S's case history was read looking for signs of eino-
tionality. it was intended that the PS subjects should
not have signs or indications of strong emotions attri-
buted to them in their histories. For example, a can-
didate for the PS group should not have had a notation in
his history that during an interview he was "crying" or
"extremely anxious." Obversely, a candidate for the NS
group should not have had terms like "unfaeling,"
"guiltless," or "cold" attributed to him. In practice
the charts were not especially useful in eliminating Ss.
This was because there was too much variability in the
contents of different charts and because many different
prison guards were responsible for the rating of inmates.
Only one £ was eliminated on the basis of chart material,
there being a large number of comjr.ents suggesting psychosis
Procedure
Because strategy choices in the Prisoner's Dilemma
(PD) game have been shown to be related to personality
traits and attitudes (Deutsch, 1960; Lutzker, 1960;
McClintock, Harrison, Strand & Gallo, 1963; Terhune, 1968),
and because the game provides an opportunity for the ex-
pression of both cooperative and exploitative behavior,
it v/as selected as the experimental paradigm for assessing
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egocentricity.
Prisoner's Dilgn^;.
_a. Typically, the PD situation is
structured so that each player has the option of inaximi-
zing his own earnings or iPaximizing i^utual earnings. To
clarify, the contingencies for the payoff matrix illus-
trated (See Figure 1) would be as follows: If both
players X and Y chose red this would be a cooperative
choice maximizing the gain of both parties (i.e., both
parties receive $ .10). if, however, either X or Y chose
red and the other person chose blue, the person choosing
blue has maximized his gain (he gets $ .15) to the other's
disadvantage (he gets $ .05). Both players choosing blue
would result in mutual loss (i.e., both players would
receive $ .03)
.
In this experiment, the basic procedure was modified
to make the situation more sensitive to exploitative or
egocentric behavior. A real player Y was eliminated, and
instead the subject played against a predetermined series
of responses made by the experimenter. All of Y's choices
were red or cooperative. The onus, then, of cooperating,
or taking advantage of the partner, was on the subject.
Because all Ss were playing against a lOQP/o cooperative
strategy, it was feared that word of mouth v^ould communicate
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this and arouse the suspicions of future Ss. To tnininiize
this problem, the first two Ss and every sixth S after
that were buffer 3s. Included only for the purpose of
deception, these Ss played the PD against a matching of
previous choice strategy, and were allowed to earn denom-
inations of money different from actual S s . Also, in
modifying the procedure, an attempt was made to avoid
communicating to the subjects that the Prisoner's
Dilemma was in any way a "game." It was felt that if the
subjects believed the situation to be a game they would
be "set" to "win" and would choose competitive responses.
To clarify the experimental requirements and the payoff
contingencies, the usual matrix presentation format was
modified to include written statements of the contingen-
cies (See Figure 1) . The payoff contingencies were ad-
justed so that a competitive response was especially dan-
gerous (known as the "chicken" variant of the PD) resulting
in the lowest possible outcome under the condition of
mutual competitive choices. It was speculated that this
would encourage cooperation and thereby ennance the sen-
sitivity of the PD to the exploitative tendencies of the
sociopaths. In addition, to facilitate comprehension of
the procedure, a color code was included on the charts
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above the respective payoffs indicating the color choices
that would give that payoff.
The experimental procedure can be conceptualized as
being divided into four stages, three corresponding to the
three hypotheses under question, and the last to the ad-
ministration of a post-experimental questionnaire. The
instructions for the experimental procedure are presented
in Appendix A.
Egocentricitv. During the first, and longest, part
of the experiment the Ss participated in the ?D game.
Each S sat in a cubicle set off by two Masonite partitions
at right angles to each other. Each S participated in the
procedure alone but was led to believe that there was
another person facing him on the other side of the parti-
tion. The experimenter (E) was situated at a right angle
to both subject cubicles and was separated from S by one
wall of the partition. When necessary, materials were
passed to the S through a slot in the partition. The
apparatus was placed on a table top and oak tag sheets
were used to screen the S^'s view from under the table.
Posted in front of the 3 was the payoff matrix shown in
Figure 1 (minus the X and Y entries)
,
indicating the
possible choices he could make and the respective payoffs
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in cents. Although each S thought he was playing against
the other, in reality he played against the E and received
constant feedback that his "partner" was making only coop-
erative choices, i.e., was always picking red. When a
light flashed in front of him, the S selected a blue or
red card and passed it to the E through the slot in the
partition. The E in turn recorded S's selection and the
amount of money earned. The E returned the choice card
along with a payoff card which made it clear to the S
what the respective choices were and what the payoff con-
tingencies were, e.g., "you chose blue, he chose red? you
get 15j2f, he gets Sjzf." On every fifth trial, the S received
a card indicating how much money he had earned up to that
point.
Each played the game until he came as close to a
$3.00 limit as was possible given the varying "win" units
of ten and fifteen cents. No received less than $3.00
or more than $3.10. The number of trials any S took to
reach this limit depended on the proportion of cooperative
or exploitative choices that he made. The greatest possi-
ble number of trials was 30, and the least, 20. Because
inmates were not allowed to have money in their possession,
other arrangements were made so that they could convert
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their earnings into canteen merchandise, or, if they pre-
ferred, have the money credited to their account. If they
chose to convert to canteen goods, they ^^re given a
canteen slip redeemable at the canteen itself, m order
to equate, as much as possible, the delay in payrrent for
the controls and sociopaths, the controls were given
vouchers which they gave to a designated high school
official in return for cash.
After the Prisoner's Dilemma game was played up to
the $3.00 limit and the S's preference for immediate or
delayed gratification was determined (see below), a new
matrix was introduced with increased payoff values
(Figure 1) . Subjects were given only one trial on this
matrix. The purpose of its inclusion was to increase
the attractiveness of an exploitative strategy. By doing
this it was hoped that sociopaths who might have been
making cooperative choices to impress the examiner would
be attracted enough by the higher payoff to change their
strategy to a more exploitative one.
Delay of Payoff . At the end of the PD game, each S
was asked to indicate on a slip of paper whether he would
prefer the money he had earned that day immediately after
the experim.ent was over; or whether he v;ould prefer to
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wait a week, at which ti.e a dollar bonus would be added,
bringing his earnings to approximately four dollars.
Risk Tak ing. For the third phase of the experirr.ent
,
the S was taken to another room. The E explained to the
S that he now had the opportunity to increase his earnings
He could do this if he cnose by spinning a dial on a board
where the numbers one through five were written, if he
got a five, the E would pay him fifteen dollars, if he
did not get a five, he would lose all that he had earned
(with the exception of the dollar bonus for those Ss who
chose to delay)
. The S was told what the odds against
him were.
Post-experiment Questionnaires
. After the S had
made his risk choice, the E asked him to rate his partner
on several variables (see Appendix B)
, and to fill out
answers to a questionnaire in nis own words (see Appendix
C)
.
In administering the rating scale, the questions
alternately reversed scale direction to help prevent in-
discriminate marking. The amount of income from any
source that the S received in a v«ek was also determined
at this time.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The sociopaths and norir.al controls Tvere compared,
in total, on 33 variables. The basic statistical treat-
ments were the chi-square for independence, and the one-
factor analysis of variance (with the Newinan-Keuls
sequential range test eir.ployed, when appropriate, for
comparisons between means)
. The F max test was initially
applied to the data to ascertain the presence of homo-
geneity of variance. In several instances, F max re-
vealed violations of the homogeneity assumption. Because
the violations were minor and the analysis of variance is
a robust procedure (Lindquist, 1953? Myers, 1966) its use
was not contraindicated. Discussions of those instances
of heterogeneity of variance are offered, where relevant,
in the presentation of results.
In the statistical analysis of the data, a confidence
level of
_£ = .05 was adopted. At this value or below, the
null hypothesis was not accepted. For the sake of
thoroughness, ho^vever, significance levels from £ <.01 to
2 <.10 are reported. Directional tests of significance
were em.ployed where indicated.
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Group Matching and Selection Variables
An attempt was ir,ade to match the three groups for age,
SES, IQ, funds available, and race. The means and stan-
dard deviations for these variables, with the exception of
race, which was treated separately, are presented in Table
1. The F ratios for each variable are reported in Appendix
D. Inspection of Table 1 reveals that the subject groups
were significantly different on the m.easures age and funds
available. For both indices, both groups of sociopaths
differed from the controls but not from each other. Be-
cause groups were not matched on these two variables,
either Pearson product moment correlations or point bi-
serial correlations were calculated between these measures
and the major dependent measures, to determine if group
differences on these variables were effected by differences
in the matching variables. The correlations obtained for
the relationships between age and percent exploitative
response, irraiaediate and delayed gratification, and high
and low risk were .14, .04, and .13, respectively. The
correlations between funds available and the dependent
measures were -.15, .02, and .15. None of the correla-
tions were significant, (df = 103), permitting the assump-
tion that any group differences present on the major
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TABLE 1
Comparisons of Means and Standard Deviations for Th
Subject Groups on Matching Variables with Significa
Levels Obtained from the Newman-Keuls Sequential
Range Test
Groups Age IQ SES Funds
Descriptive Data
Mean 3.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean 3 .D.
c 17.9 .9 104.5 12.3 25.9 on o 9.69 5 . 41
PS 21.4 2.0 103.5 10.2 25.5 16.8 6.75 4 .25
NS 20.7 1.7 101.3 9.5 24.3 16.8 7.03 4 .25
Newman-Keuls Comparisons (p values)
C-PS .01 n n .05
C-NS .01 n n .05
NS-PS .10 n n n
Note.—All significance levels are less than the p
values indicated. d >.1C is indicated by the letter n.
dependent variables were not contributed to by group
differences in age and funds available.
For the age variable, a significant value of F max
was obtained (F max = 4.95, £ <.01) . The occurrence here
of heterogeneity of variance appears to be the consequence
of the limited range of Ss available from the upper grades
of the high school population.
The data for race v«re analyzed by chi-square. The
number of Black subjects for the C, PS. and NS groups were
24, 25, and 24, respectively. The value of obtained was
not significant, denoting that all groups were equally
matched on this variable (x^ = .03, df^ = 2) .
In Table 2 the means and standard deviations for the
MMPI-based group selection measures are presented along
with the significance levels for the Newman-Keuls compari-
sons of group means. The F ratios for these variables in
addition to the other MMPI measures are found in Appendix
D. For the Total Anxiety and MAS measures, computation of
F max indicated minor violations of the homogeneity of
variance assumption. The values obtained were 3.47 and
3.92 respectively (£ <.01). These minor violations of
homogeneity of variance are the result of experim^ental
manipulations, in that all control Ss were included in
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TABLE 2
Comparisons of Means and Standard Deviations for Principal
MMPI Group Assignment Measures with Significance
Levels Obtained from the Newman-Keuls Sequential
Range Test
Groups Pd Ma Ta MAS
Descriptive Data
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
C 19.9 3.0 20.7 3.3 210.0 22.1 12.0 5.6
PS 28.6 2.1 24.8 2.5 211.4 11.9 7.8 2.3
NS 29.7 3.2 24.6 2.7 249.1 15.3 18.0 4.6
Newman-Keuls Comparisons (£ values)
C-PS .01 .01 n .01
C-NS .01 .01 .01 .01
NS-PS n n .01 .01
Note.—All significance levels are less than the p
values indicated,
_£ >.10 is indicated by the letter n.
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the study regardless of their Total Anxiety and MAS scores,
while sociopaths, on the other hand, were excluded or in-
cluded in the experiment based on the values of Total
Anxiety and KAS
.
Consequently, their scores exhibited
less variance than did those for the control subjects.
The statistical analyses reported in Table 2 and
Table 23 (see Appendix D) provide a gross quantitative
measure of the success of the selection procedures. The
Newman-Keuls analyses indicate that the PSs and NSs did
not differ on Pd and Ma of the MI4PI, but were, in accord
with selection objectives, significantly different <.01)
on Total Anxiety and MAS, the PSs having lower scores on
both measures. Control Ss were significantly different
from the sociopaths on Pd and Ma as well as I4AS
. On the
latter measure, their scores fell midway between the PSs
and NSs. Neurotic sociopaths and controls were signifi-
cantly different on Total Anxiety but PSs and controls
were not.
Figure 2 presents the graphed MMPI profiles for the
three groups. Table 3 presents a comparison of the MMPI
T-scores for all 13 scales with significance levels
between group means obtained from the Newman-Keuls
sequential range test.
55
O C Group
?S Group
N3 Group
Figure 2. Graphs of lillPI T-scores
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TABLE 3
Coraparisons of Subject Groups' MMPI T-3cores with
Significance Levels of Multiple Comparisons
Obtained frorr. the Newroan-Keuls
Sequential Range Test
MMPI Scales
L F K Hs D Hv Pd Mf Pa Pt Sc Ma Si
c 50 58 51 52 56 51 53 59 50 52 55 60 51
PS 53 55 57 52 56 55 74 57 50 52 55 70 45
NS 53 62 49 59 65 60 76 61 56 62 59 70 50
Newman-Keuls Comparisons (p values)
C-PS n n .01 n n .05 .01 n n n n .01 .01
C-NS n .01 n .01 .01 .01 .01 n .01 .01 n .01 n
NS-PS n .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 n n .01 .01 n n .01
Note.—All significance levels are less than the
values indicated.
_£ >.10 is indicated by the letter _n.
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Major Dependent Variablf^a
Prisoner's dilemrr.a and exploitative behavior . Sub-
jects participating in the PD played the gaine for an un-
equal number of trials but for approximately equal amounts
of money. For this reason, S s ' exploitative scores are
presented in percent form. The means and standard devia-
tions for the percent exploitative response for each
group are presented in Table 4. Significance of differ-
ences between the means was tested by an analysis of
variance (see Table 5) . No significant differences were
found. Hypothesis 1 therefore was not confirmed. Socio-
paths did not exhibit significantly greater exploitative
behavior than the control subjects. Results were in the
predicted direction for the PS and C groups, the PSs
scoring higher on exploitativeness , but the mean group
difference of 5.5% was slight. Neurotic sociopaths, in
opposition to prediction, scored slightly lower than the
Cs on exploitativeness.
In examining exploitative behavior in the PD game,
particular attention was focused on S^s ' responses on
trials one and two. Choice behavior on these trials was
considered especially important for several reasons.
Trial one, of all trials, best reflected the S's initial
attitude or posture towards his partner. Because a
58
TABLE 4
Means and Standard Deviations for Percent Exploitative
Response in the Prisoner's Dilemma Garre
Group Mean Standard Deviation
C 60.9 25.3
PS 66.4 24.3
NS 59.8 31.7
TABLE 5
Suiranary of Analysis of Variance for
Percent Exploitative Response
Source of Variation df SS MS
59
Between Groups 2 881.313 440.656 .592 n
Within Groups 102 75952.750 744.635
Total 104 76334.063
Note.
—
o >.10 indicated by the letter n.
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response on this trial preceded feedback from the partner
and the establishment of a pattern of interaction, the 3
having been explained the nature of the payoff contingen-
cies was in the position of having to guess at his part-
ner's probable strategy. A trusting S, expecting his
partner to pick red, would likely respond in kind and
choose red also. On the other hand a suspicious S, ex-
pecting his partner to choose blue, might be expected to
choose blue himself in order to teach the other person a
lesson and prevent him from obtaining an advantage. Con-
sistent with the theoretical position that sociopaths are
egocentric, they were expected to be less trustful and more
likely to select blue on the first trial.
Subjects' responses to trial two were also of special
interest since it was the first time the ^s made a strategy
choice with the benefit of feedback on the other's willing-
ness to cooperate. Over iterated trials the possibility
existed that the "other's" unconditionally cooperative
behavior may have made S^s somewhat skeptical of the reality
of their partner. This possible disbelief in the presence
of the other could have had the effect of diluting group
differences. Such skepticism, while conceivably present on
later trials, oould hardly have been present on trial two.
Response on trial one, then, gave som.e idea of how
trusting a was, and choice on trial two would seem to
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reflect on how trustworthy the S was. It was anticipated
that sociopaths would be less trusting and trustworthy.
In Table 6 are reported the percent of Ss choosing
the exploitative response on trials one and two. Results
are given in percent form because of the loss of one S's
data. The data presented in Table 6 were analyzed by the
use of X
.
A total of six were indicated, three for
the groups comparisons on trial one, and three for the
groups comparisons on trial two. Rather than computing
all six the for the largest group difference on
either trial was computed first under the following
rationale. If this x were nonsignificant, then none of
the other x^ could be significant. If this x^, however,
were significant, then the x^ for the next largest group
difference would be calculated—and so on. As it happened,
the x^ obtained for the NS and C groups on trial two (the
largest of the six differences) was not significant
(X^ = 1.18, df £ ^.15, one-tailed test). "While group
differences did not reach significance, more sociopaths
than controls chose the exploitative response for both
trials
.
A further analysis was undertaken to determine if the
sociopathic and control groups differed in exploitative
TABLE 6
Percent of Subjects Choosing the Exploitative
Response on Trials One and Two in
the Prisoner's Dilerrana Game
Trial One
C
PS
NS 43
Trial Two
35 44
46 54
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behavior over the course of PD play. Also of interest
was whether exploitativeness varied over trials for all
groups. To answer these questions a two factor Groups X
Blocks repeated measures analysis of variance (see Table 8)
was performed on the mean number of exploitative choices
per block (see Table 7) . Generally, before a repeated
measures analysis of variance is performed, heterogeneity
of covariance is determined. Because this procedure is
laborious, an alternate procedure, outlined by V7iner
(1962) was employed. This alternate method assumes hetero-
geneity of covariance and evaluates F ratios on adjusted
degrees of freedom. Because of the loss of data for one
subject, the analysis was adjusted for unequal N by the
method of least squares. Due to the fact that the number
of trials for individual S^s varied between 20 and 30, the
lower limit of 20 trials, divided into four blocks, was
used for the analysis. As can be seen (Table 8), there
was a significant Blocks main effect which is consistent
with the preponderance of research with the PD, which has
found an increase in com.petitive choices over a short
number of trials (Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967; Lutzker, 1960;
Vinacke, 1969). There was no significant Group main effect
or Groups X Blocks interaction, though as can be seen
64
TABLE 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Exploitative
Choices for Each of Four Trial Blocks
^^Q^PS Block One Block Two Block Three Block Four
^gan S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean s.D.
1.41 2.9 1.54 3.3 1.78 3.6 1.80
1.47 3.2 1.37 3.4 1.48 3.7 1.41
1.60 2.9 1.73 3.1 1.85 3.3 1.74
C 2.1
PS 2.7
NS 2.5
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TABLE 8
Summary of Groups X Blocks Analysis of
Variance for Mean Number Exploitative
Choices Per Block
Source of Variation df ss MS
^^°^PS 2 7.09 3.54 .453 n
Subjects Within Groups 101 789.29 7.81
3 66.30 22.10 26.465 .01
Groups X Blocks 6 4.46 .74 .889 n
Blocks X Subjects Within
Blocks 303 253.00
.83
Note.—All significance levels are less than the £
values indicated, p >.10 is indicated by the letter n.
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clearly from Figure 3, the PSs ^re consistently (albeit
nonsignificantly) more exploitative than either NSs or Cs
over all trial blocks.
Exploitative behavior on the second matrix with higher
payoff values (introduced for one trial) was not signifi-
cantly different for the three groups (x^ = .544, df = 2,
£ >.10). The number of subjects choosing blue for the Cs,
PSs, and NSs were 18, 21, and 19, respectively. These
results were in the predicted direction.
In sum, on the aggregate measures of exploitativeness
obtained from the PD situation, sociopaths were not signi-
ficantly different from controls. There were, however,
trends in the data. Both groups of sociopaths combined,
tended, on the average, to choose the exploitative strategy
more frequently than did normals. Primary sociopaths were
consistently more exploitative than controls. Sociopaths
tended to be less trusting and trustworthy as reflected in
their behavior on the first two trials of the PD . In
addition, when exploitation in the PD was made a more
appealing option, sociopaths once again tended to respond
more competitively. All these findings were in the pre-
dicted direction, but all differences were small and
nonsignificant
.
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Blocks of five trials
Figure 3. Changes in exploitative choices over trial
blocks
.
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Irrmedlate vs. delayed gratificatlnn . Before analyzing
the data for delay of gratification, it was important to
determine that subject groups had not earned unequal amounts
of money up to the imrrediate vs. delay decision choice
point. This concern also applied for monies earned for the
high or low risk decision. In Table 9 are presented the
means and standard deviations for monies earned up to both
these major decision points. A surrtmary of the analyses
of variance is reported in Table 10. As can be seen from
Table 9, approximately $3.00 per group had been earned as
of the immediate vs. delay decision point, and no signifi-
cant differences among groups in money earned were found
at this point. For the high vs. low risk choice, groups
had earned approximately $3.30. The additional 300 was the
average sum earned on the one trial of play with the
second payoff matrix. No group differences were found here
either
.
The number of delay choices for the Cs, PSs, and NSs
were 13, 19, and 11, respectively. These differences ;-;ere
analyzed by a series of three the three possible
between groups comparisons. Because prediction and
existing theory indicated the direction of differences, the
chi-squares for the comparisons of the experimental groups
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TABLE 9
Means and Standard Deviations of Monies Earned
at Each of the Two Major Choice Points
First Second
Q^^Q^Ps choice point (I vs. D) choice point (H vs. L)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
C 3.03 .04 3.31 .09
PS 3.05 .04 3.34 .09
NS 3.03 .04 3.31 .09
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TABLE 10
Suitmary of Analyses of Variance for Monies
Earned at Each of the Two Major
Choice Points
Source of Variation df SS MS F
Immediate vs
.
Delay Choice Point
Between Groups 2 .006 .003 2.025 n
Within Groups 102 .149 .002
Total 104 . 155
High vs. Low Risk Choice Point
Between Groups 2 .016 .008 1.023 n
Within Groups 102 .814 .008
Total 104 .831
Note.
—
^ >.10 is indicated by the letter n
.
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with the control group were assessed against one-tailed
tests. Because little is known about the relationship
of PSs and NSs, the chi-square comparing these groups
was tested non-directionally
, i.e., with a two-tailed
test. The comparison of number of delay choices between
the Cs and NSs yielded a significant of 2.886 (df = 1,
2 <.05). The obtained for the difference bet^z/een Cs
and PSs was .06 (df = 1, £ >.10). The x^ for the differ-
ences between the NSs and PSs was 3.74 (df = 1, p <.06),
approaching significance. The results of these analyses
indicate that hypothesis 2 was confirmed only in part.
The Cs demonstrated a significantly greater capacity for
delayed gratification than the NSs, but no differences in
delaying capacity was found for the Cs and PSs. Surpris-
ingly, the PSs and NSs were found to be dissimilar in their
preferences for delayed gratification. The PSs were more
like the Cs and exhibited greater delay capacity than tne
NSs, the difference closely approaching significance.
High vs. low risk . As discussed above and illustrated
in Table 9, no differences existed in money earned up to
the high vs. low risk decision point.
The number of C, PS, and NS subjects choosing high
risk were 2, 8, and 2, respectively. Before these results
for the high vs. low risk variable can be meaningfully
discussed, however, it is necessary to think about a pro-
blem of interpretation of these data that was created by
a weakness inherent in the experimental design. Because
a subject's high or low choice follo^ved his choice of
immediate or delayed gratification, different
_Ss were
presented with different options at the high vs. low risk
decision making point. A who had chosen to delay was
told that if he lost in the risk situation he would lose
all his money except the $1.00 bonus for waiting a week.
A who had chosen an imonediate response was told that
he would lose all his money. Clearly, the delay S^, who
ended up with some money (no matter how little) would
likely find the high risk option more attractive than
would the immediate S (who might end up with no money)
.
In order to determine if an immediate or delay choice
had an effect on risk taking, a x'^ '-^^s calculated between
immediate and delay S_s (summiing over groups) for high and
low risk choices. The value of x" obtained (y^ = 4.64,
df "1, p <.05) indicated that S-s making a delay choice
were more likely to opt for the high risk than immediate
choice S^s. Though this weakness was inherent in the
design of the experim.ent, no problem in interpretation
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would have occurred had the results ccnforT^ed to predic-
tion. It was hypothesized that sociopaths would prefer
iimiediate gratification and higher risk. Had the socio-
paths chosen the inmediate contingency more often than
normals, this would have biased their decision against
high risk. If they then chose high risk more frequently,
even stronger support would have been indicated for their
high risk propensity.
Interpretation, then, of risk taking behavior cannot
be made without first comparing groups on their delay
decisions. Because no difference in delay preference was
found for the PSs and Cs, their risk taking behavior can
be compared directly. A directional test was perform^ed
( = 4.20, df = 1, p <.025). This confirmed hypothesis 3
for the primary sociopaths, which stated that sociopaths
would exhibit greater risk taking behavior than controls.
A comparison of the delay choices of the Cs and N3s re-
vealed that nearly twice as many C subjects preferred
delayed reward. This being so, a negative bias was in-
troduced against the neurotic sociopaths choosing the high
risk option—they had more to lose than the control
subjects. That 2 control subjects and 2 neurotic socio-
paths preferred high risks suggests that neurotic
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sociopaths may have a greater propensity for high risk
conditions. This possibility is supported by the data for
subjects' ratings of their perception of risk (see Table 16
below) which shows that neurotic sociopaths rated the
four to one odds as more favorable than did the controls.
A statistical comparison of tne number of PSs and
NSs who preferred high risk indicated that the PSs ex-
hibited the greater proclivity for risk taking (^2 = 4,20,
M " 1' £ <.05). After considering the delay behavior of
both these groups, the finding for risk preference still
holds but less strongly. Nearly twice as many PSs chose
delay as the NSs. If the groups were equal in risk taking
preference, it might have been expected that twice as many
PS as NS subjects would have chosen high risk. In actual-
ity, four times as many primary sociopaths chose high risk
as did neurotic sociopaths.
In sum, statistical analysis of the risk choices
allows for the conclusion that significantly more PSs pre-
ferred high risk than Cs. A post hoc, crude interpreta-
tion of the results suggests that NSs may fall m.idway
between Cs and PSs in their preference for high risk.
Supplementary Dependent Variables
Ratings
.
Subjects filled out ratings on intelligence
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of the other person, cooperation of the other person,
cooperation of self, and the other's consistency. Means
and standard deviations for tnese ratings are presented
in Table 11. The values in Table 11 have been adjusted
so that for each scale 1 represents the low end and 7 the
high end of the scale. The F ratios for each scale are
presented in Table 12. None of the F ratios reached
significance, indicating that none of the groups differed
from each other in their overall ratings.
To compare S s
'
ratings of their own cooperativeness
and others cooperativeness, a repeated measures Groups X
Cooperativeness analysis of variance was performed. The
results of this analysis are summarized in Table 13. As
can be seen, no main effect for Groups or interaction
effect for Groups X Cooperativeness was found. There was,
however, a significant main effect for Cooperativeness
(£ <.01) . This indicates that all groups accurately
perceived the "other person" as m.ore cooperative than
themselves. Rather than laboriously computing the matrix
of covariances for this analysis, heterogeneity of co-
variance was assumed and the main effect for cooperation
was tested against a critical value based on the adjusted
degrees of freedom of 1 and 34 (Winer, 1962)
.
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TABLE 11
Standard Deviations for Rating Scores
Intelligence Cooperation Cooperation Consistency
^^Q^Ps of other of other of self
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean s.D. Mean s.D.
C 3.9 1.6 5.7 1.6 3.6 2.2 5.6 1.9
1.7 5.4 2.1 4.1 2.3 5.6 2.1
4.3 2.1 5.7 1.9 4.2 2.5 5.2 2.3
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TABLE 12
Summary of Analyses of Variance for Rating Scores
Source of Variation df SS MS F
Intelligence of Other
Between Groups 2 11.369 5.685
Within Groups 102 333.256 3.267
Total 104 344.626
1.740 n
Cooperation of Other
Between Groups 2 1.844 .922
Within Groups 102 369.142 3.619
.255 n
Total 104 370.986
Cooperation of Self
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
2 8.126 4.063 .738 n
102 561.713 5.507
104 569.839
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TABLE 12 (contd.)
Consistency
Between Groups 2
Within Groups 102
Total 104
Note.—£ >.lo is indicated by the letter n.
4.012 2.006
.455
449.942 4.411
453.954
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TABLE 13
Summary of Groups X Cooperativeness Analysis
of Variance for Rating Scores
Source of Variation df SS
'
MS F S.
Groups 2 2 .60 1.30
. 274 n
Subjects within Groups 102 484 .26 4.75
Cooperativeness 1 142 .52 142.52 32 .550 .01
Groups X Cooperativeness 2 7 .38 3.69 .843 n
Cooperativeness X Subjects 102 446 .60 4.38
within Groups
Note.—Significance levels are less than the
indicated values. d >.10 is indicated by the letter n.
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Though the control and experiinental groups were not
found to be different in their rating scores, it was con-
sidered of interest to determine whether S s ' rating scores
differed in relation to the degree of exploitative
behavior exhibited in the PD
. Presented in Table 14 are
the product moment correlations for degree of exploita-
tive response and rating scale scores for each group. For
the correlations between exploitative response and rating
of others' intelligence, significant inverse correlations
{2 <.01) were found for the NSs and Cs but not for the
PSs. It appears that for the NS and C groups, the more
exploitative Ss tended to devalue the intelligence of
their partner.
The correlations between exploitativeness and cooper-
ation of the other were all nonsignificant, but were all
inverse, suggesting that there was a tendency for high
exploitative S^s to misperceive their partner as uncoopera-
tive. This effect could have occurred as the result of
some high exploitative Ss' attempts to rationalize their
behavior by projecting uncooperat iveness onto the other.
It is also possible that this finding of an inverse rela-
tionship bet'veen degree of exploitativeness and coopera-
tion of the other person comes from the general devaluing
81
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of the other person that would likely be associated with
his willingness to be victimized. In completing the
rating forms, a negative halo effect may have been opera-
ting which reduced the ratings on those scales which
reflected on the worth of the other person.
The correlations for degree of exploitation and self
cooperation were all in the negative direction. Signifi-
cant correlations {£ <.01) were found for the NSs and Cs
but not for the PSs. For these two groups there was a
trend for high exploitative Ss to rate their cooperative-
ness in accord with their exploitat iveness
. The nonsigni-
ficant correlation for the PS group suggests that these
S^s were less willing or able to accurately label their
exploitative behavior.
As anticipated, no significant correlations were
obtained between degree of exploitation and subjects'
perception of the others' consistency.
In order to determine if the correlations between
degree of exploitative response and rating scores were
significantly different between groups, the correlations
were transformed to z scores and group differences were
calculated. These are presented in Table 15. As can be
seen from Table 15, none of the group differences reacned
in
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Significance. The one group difference closest to
approaching significance <.io) occurred between the Cs
and PSs for the relationship between degree of exploita-
tion and self cooperativeness
.
The means and standard deviations for S s • perception
of risk scores are presented in Table 16. The perception
of risk rating scale was presented to Ss as part of the
questionnaire because its content was i.ost appropriate in
that context. A 5 point scale was used. Analysis of the
rating scores for heterogeneity of variance obtained an F
niax value of 4.44 (£ <.01), indicating a violation of the
homogeneity of variance assumption. Examination of the
distribution of rating scores suggests that heterogeneity
of variance occurred as the consequence of the control 3s'
ratings clustering about the lower end of the rating scale.
Analysis of variance (see Table 17) yielded an F ratio
approaching significance (_£ <.10).
Because the corollary to hypothesis 3 predicted that
sociopaths would consider the risk as more favorable than
would the controls, the rating scores for the control group
were compared directly to the scores for both sociopathic
groups by the use of Dunnett
' s t_ test (Winer, 1962). The
mean rating scores for PSs and NSs being the same, a
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TABLE 16
Means and Standard Deviations for
Perception of Risk Taking Scores
^i-HHi^ Mean Standard Deviation
C 1-.83
.57
PS 2.26
.92
NS 2.26 1.20
TABLE 17
Suininary of Analysis of Variance for Perception
of Risk Rating Scores
Source of Variation df ss MS
Between Groups 2 4.285 2.143 2.474
Within Groups 102 88.343
.866
Total 104 92.628
Note.—The significance value is less than th
£ value indicated.
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single value of Dunnetf s t was obtained for the compari-
son of both these groups with the controls (t = 1.94,
df = 102, £ <.05). AS predicted, sociopaths, as coir.pared
to normal controls, perceived the same risk contingencies
as less risky.
Questionnaire answers
. A questionnaire was included
in the study to determine what strategies and motives Ss
were able to articulate as affecting their decisions in
the various phases of the experiment. Subjects* answers
to each question were inspected and the motives that seemed
to be operating were identified. Subjects' responses were
then placed in the motive category that was most appropriate
The results for the questionnaire are sketchy at best.
This is because a large number of Ss, in several in-
stances nearly fifty percent, gave ansv;ers which were ex-
tremely idiosyncratic or incomprehensible. Such a large
percentage of uncategorized responses dim.inishes the con-
fidence that can be placed in the ganeralizability of
these results. For this reason no attempt at a rigorous
statistical analysis was made.
The first question put to ^s was, "vVhat '^ere you
trying to do in the decision making situation with the
other person?" In Table 18 the percent of S^s falling into
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the motive categories: econoinic, competitive, cooperative,
and unclassified are presented. Economic motivation in
response to this question refers to an answer which stated
that the S was trying to make money, with no mention of
winning or in any way assuming an advantage over the other
person. Any statement which expressed or implied the idea
of winning or doing better than the other was assigned to
the competitive category. Cooperation was interpreted as
any statement which incorporated the idea of sharing
equally.
Review of Table 18 suggests that the predominant mo-
tive operating across subject groups in the selection of
strategy in the PD was the competitive motive. Though no
significant differences were found between groups on the
behavioral measures of exploitation in the PD (see dis-
cussion above), S s
' responses to question one suggest that
Cs tended to perceive themselves as playing most competi-
tively and NSs as m.ost cooperatively. This finding is
consistent with the order of differences, though nonsigni-
ficant, of mean rating scores for the three groups ratings
of their own cooperativeness (see Table 11) . From the C
groups' responses to question one it appears that, of the
three groups, their choices in the PD were least motivated
90
by economic gain.
The question asked in item two of the questionnaire
was, "What did YOU think the other person was doing in
the decision making situation?" The replies to this
question are categorized in Table 19. in addition to the
three motives already identified in response to question
one, for question two "color choosing" and "playing it
safe" occurred frequently enough to be treated as separate
motives. Color choosing simply refers to a S writing
that his partner was picking red or blue with no attempt
to elaborate the interpersonal implications of that choice.
As can be seen from Table 19 the most frequent motive t
assigned to the partners in the PD vas cooperation. On
the average, 2C% of the Ss in each group responded this
way. However, a large percent of Ss, on tne average 18%,
attributed a competitive orientation to their partner,
which does not speak well for the £s ' comprehension of
the simulated other's unconditionally cooperative strategy.
Question three asked the following, depending on the
subject's immediate-delay choice: 'What m,ade you take your
money today?" "VJhat made you wait a week for your money?"
Summarized replies to this question are presented in Table
20 under the two major headings of Imir;ediate and Delayed
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gratification. The motives identified as operating for
the inTTr.ediate choice Ss were present need, money not
worth it, and negative attitude toward waiting. For delay
choice Ss, the motives were no present need, economic gain,
and positive attitude towards waiting. Present or no pre-
sent need refer to an explicit statement of need or its
absence. For example, an imjnediate choice 3^ saying he
needed cigarettes, or a delay S saying he did not need
anything now. Positive or negative attitude towards
waiting applies to those answers which were more abstractly
or philosophically stated, and which seemed to represent
a general attitude toward waiting. An example of such a
response would be an immediate choice saying that,
"Tomorrow isn't promised." The predominant motive for the
immediate choice Ss was present need, 60% of the Ss on the
average expressing this m.otive. For the delay _3s, the pre-
dominant motives were economic gain (45/o of the ^s) and no
present need (44.7% of the S^s) . For both immediate and
delay choice decisions, need orientation occurred as a
strong determinant of choice. It is possible that immed-
iate vs. delay Ss may be differentiated in terms of their
need tolerance, Cs and PSs exhibiting the greater need
tolerance
.
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In Table 21 are presented the percent of Ss in each
motive category expressed in response to question four
which asked, depending on the S's risk choice: "What made
you decide to spin the dial?" "What decided you against
spinning the dial?" The motives for the high risk condi-
tion were economic gain and positive attitude about gamb-
ling, and, for the low risk condition, fear of losing,
recognition of poor risk, negative attitude towards
gambling, and poor risk and fear of losing combined.
Recognition of poor risk refers to a statement such as
"The odds were too great." The predominant motive for
high risk S^s was econom.ic gain, 50% of the Ss expressing
this attitude. For the low risk condition, recognition
of poor risk was the chief motive, 45% of the S^s ' responses
coming under this heading.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The question of whether the concept of sociopathy
represents a meaningful diagnostic category was the
stimulus for the present research. To date, acceptance
of the existence and dimensions of sociopathy has been
based almost exclusively on clinical observation and case
study. Given the lack of objective measurement inherent
in clinical observation, the need for more rigorous ex-
perimental verification was clear. The present study was
an attempt in that direction.
Egocentricitv
One of the cardinal traits associated with the socio-
path is the superficiality of his emotions. The media, as
well as professional writings (Cleckley, 1964; McCord &
McCord, 1964), call attention to the self-centeredness of
the sociopath. He is consistently depicted as a ruthless
individual concerned with meeting his own needs at the
expense of, or through the manipulation of others. The
title of Truman Capote's book In Cold Blood probably best
captures the fear that the lay person associates with the
possible consequences of the sociopath's incapacity to
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to feel towards others.
Given the vivid and ubiquitous picture of the socio-
path's extreme egocentrism, hypothesis 1 was proffered with
some confidence. It stated that sociopaths would be signi-
ficantly more exploitative than normals in their game
playing strategies in the prisoner's dilem,ma. The hypoth-
esis was not confirmed. No significant differences were
found between the groups. The PSs were, hov;ever, con-
sistently more exploitative over the course of play than
either the NSs or controls. This finding suggests (albeit
weakly) that primary sociopaths may be more egocentric
than normals, and that a difference may exist between
primary sociopaths and neurotic sociopaths in egocentri-
city. This would be consistent with theoretical form.u-
lations. It has been argued by Karpman (1943b) and
Schmauk (1987) that neurotic sociopaths resemble primary
sociopaths only in the gross aspects of their behavior
and that the primary sociopath is the "true" sociopath.
Particular attention was paid to the strategy choices
made on trials one and two of the PD . Trial one was of
special interest because it best reflected a S's initial
reaction to nis partner and the payoff matrix. As such,
it was a measure of S's initial trust or suspicion of
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his partner. Trial two, in turn, following the feedback
that the partner would cooperate, served as a measure of
the trustworthiness of the subject. No significant differ-
ences were found between the groups for these two trials,
but on both trials the sociopaths exhibited a greater
tendency toward exploitativeness
.
The behavior of the groups on the second matrix,
with greater absolute values, once again showed no signi-
ficant differences in exploitativeness, though again
there was a slight margin in the predicted direction for
the sociopaths.
On all the measures of exploitativeness, no signifi-
cant differences were found between the three groups. On
nearly all the measures, however, sociopaths tended to
evidence small margins of greater exploitativeness.
Additional perspective may be gained by considering
the present results within the context of related litera-
ture. In interpreting the results, it is important to
consider the experimental circumstances within which they
were obtained. Because the PD was used as an experimental
paradigm, it is necessary to assess its discriminative
sensitivity to personality and attitudinal variables and
the nature of these variables.
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In a review article, Vinacke (1969) pointed out that
differences have been found in PD play for sex. age, cul-
ture, family background, psychopathology
, and attitudes
and traits differences. Of particular interest here are
the differences that have been found in attitudinal and
personality variables. Wrightsman (1966), using scores
on a personality inventory called the Philosophies of
Human Nature Scale, found that persons who believed human
nature to be altruistic, trustworthy, and independent be-
haved in a two-trial version of the PD in more trusting
ways than did Ss with unfavorable attitudes toward numan
nature. On trial one, Ss were told that their choice
would be revealed to their partner before he chose. Under
these conditions, the S^s with the more favorable attitudes
toward others chose cooperation more frequently, indica-
ting their trust in the other person. McClintock et al.
(1963) and Lutzker (1960) have both looked at the poli-
tically related attitudinal variable of internationalism -
isolationism as a predictor of cooperative behavior in the
PD. Internationalism - isolationism was assessed by a 36
item scale developed by Lutzker. An internationalist was
defined as one who trusts other nations, is willing to
cooperate with them, perceives international agencies such
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as the U.N. as deterrents to war, and considers inter-
national tensions reducible by mediation. An isolationist
was defined as one who demands national strength and might
in lieu of international mediation, and who does not en-
courage commerce or transactions with other nations.
Lutzker (1960) employed three groups of Ss isolationists,
internationalists, and controls in a 30 trial free play
"chicken" variant of the PD
. Ke found that international-
ists made significantly more cooperative responses than
isolationists and that Cs cooperated as often as did
internationalists. Lutzker concluded that the differences
found between the two experimental groups were due to the
greater uncooperat iveness of the isolationists. McClintock
et al. (1963), also using the "chicken" form of the PD, had
two groups, internationalists and isolationists, play 60
trials of the PD against three experimenter programmed
strategies: 85% cooperative, 50% cooperative, and 15%
cooperative. McClintock found that isolationists were
more competitive than internationalists and that strategy
did not significantly affect behavior. Terhune (1968) in-
vestigated the relationship of dominance on the achieve-
ment, affiliation, and power motive, as determined by
TAT stories, on cooperation in the PD . Terhune 's Ss
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played three one-trial gai.es and a 30 trial gai.e varying
in payoff. He found that high need achievers were the
most cooperative regardless of garre matrix. Need affil-
iators were highly cooperative when playing with a matrix
which was structured so that defection from a cooperative
strategy was attended by a large loss if both players
chose uncooperatively, and by little gain if the defector
was successful in his strategy change. Persons high on
need for power ^^re most uncooperative and tried to ex-
ploit their partner more than the other groups. In
Marlowe's (1963) study on psychological needs and cooper-
ation, first year m.edical students played a PD game for
30 trials against a confederate who made an unconditionally
cooperative choice on every trial. Marlowe's results in-
dicated that cooperative Ss scored higher on need abase-
ment and deference. Psychological needs were measured
by the Heilbrun adaptation of the Gough ACL. Deutsch's
(1960) study focused on the relationship of trusting and
trustworthy behavior in the PD with scores on the F
scale of authoritarianism. Subjects played the game two
times, each time presumably with a different person.
The first time, S s ' choices were announced first. The
second tim^e, the other person's choice was announced first.
A significant relationship was found between 3s' scores on
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the P scale and game behavior. Subjects low on the F
scale made more trusting and trustworthy choices than high
scoring subjects.
From examination of the studies cited above, a
composite profile of the cooperative and competitive PD
game player can be extrapolated. The cooperative individ-
ual tends to need or desire to establish and maintain
friendly relations with others. He trusts and believes
in the basic altruism of others. He tends to be more
intellectually sophisticated and motivated to achieve-
ment with high standards of excellence. The competitive
individual tends to hold a cynical and unfavorable
attitude toward human nature, is aggressive, and is in-
dependent. In his dealings with others he prefers to
be in a position of power and strength, needing to gain
and exert control over them.
Given the above descriptions of the cooperative and
competitive game player, and the current conceptions of
sociopathy, one might have expected sociopaths to mani-
fest more competitive behavior than normals. This ex-
pectation also seemed reinforced by the fact that the
personality differences found in the above PD games were
assessed principally by paper and pencil tests, while the
measure of sociopathy used in this study was based on a
solid foundation of behavioral criteria, nam.ely,
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criminalism and recidivism. That no differences in
exploitativeness were found suggests the possibility that
clinical description has exaggerated the role of egocen-
tricity in sociopathy.
Additional support for the position that sociopaths
may not be as exploitative as currently believed may be
found readily. m one study (Berger & Tedeschi, 1969)
delinquents played the PD game. While a delinquent pop-
ulation as such is a more heterogenous grouping than PSs
and NSs combined, there are no doubt more sociopaths among
delinquents than am.ong normals. For this reason, Berger
and Tedeschi- s findings have a direct bearing on the
issue of exploitativeness and sociopathy. Their subjects
were 10-13 year old delinquents, dependent children, and
normals. They played a 50 trial game against a 50% coop-
erative random strategy. The gam.e was modified by giving
_Ss the option after every seventh trial of "zapping" the
other by taking $10.00 from the other at a cost to them-
selves of $2, $5, $8, or $11.00 depending on cell assign-
ments. Subjects played for "M & M" candy on a one "M &
M" for $1,00 basis. No main effect for groups and coop-
erative strategy selections was found. There were also
no differences related to the frequency of exercising
the option of punishing the other. The only finding
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which suggested that delinquents were i.ore exploitative
was their tendency to be more competitive than their
normal counterparts when the dummy other cooperated on
the trial preceding the "zap" option.
Sutler's study (1970) is directly related to the
present study and in a number of ways complements it.
Sutker's investigation, like the present one, tested ex-
perimentally the clinical description of the sociopath
as being insensitive to the feelings of others. A vi-
carious conditioning paradigm was used to test her
hypothesis of reduced sensitivity in sociopaths. Unlike
the present investigation which worked with incarcerated
sociopaths, Sutker's study employed a group of uninstitu-
tionalized sociopaths whose nam.es had been obtained from
several mental health agencies as having been diagnosed
as sociopathic personality within a year's time. In
addition to the diagnosis of sociopathic personality, an
elevated T-score on the Pd scale of the MMPI was required
for inclusion in the sociopathic group.
The results of her study indicated that there were
no differences between sociopaths and non-sociopaths in
basal skin resistance. Contrary to prediction, she
found that sociopaths reacted with significantly greater
GSR conductance changes to all stimuli across trials.
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The sociopaths, ho^'ever, responded with less anticipation
of shocks to the stooge than when they observed the actual
discomfort of the stooge associated with the specifically
shocked stimulus nuirber. On Sutker's other measure of
interpersonal insensitivity
, the relinq^aishing of quarters,
no significant differences were found between groups. The
direction of differences, however, were in the favor of
the sociopaths being more altruistic. This was also true
for sociopaths' answers to a post-session questionnaire on
which they evidenced a stronger dislike for the other in-
dividual's discomfort.
Sutker interpreted her findings of greater change in
GSR activity for the sociopaths as evidence of vicarious
instigation, but she was reluctant to conclude that the
sociopaths empathized with the other person. She stated
that it is uncertain whether the sociopaths experienced
emotions similar or dissimilar to the stooge. That the
sociopaths reacted significantly more than non-sociopaths
was interpreted in accord with the position of Schacter &
Latane (1S54) that the sociopath overresponds to exciting
situations in general. Sutker explained ner findings of
greater altruism in sociopaths as probably originating
from their expertise in social manipulation, and knowing
106
that they were being monitored, they gave up their quarter!
for the socially desirable effect. It appears to the
present investigator that Sutker's explanation of her
unexpected findings is in itself a refutation of the
characteristic of sociopathy under investigation. Basic
to the concept of sociopathy is the assumption that socio-
paths are indifferent to the needs of others and are
lacking in the need for social approval. Because it was
of no advantage to the sociopaths to act in a socially
desirable manner, imputing this motive to them is tanta-
mount to describing them as not sociopathic in the tradi-
tionally-described sense.
While the present investigator is av;are of the haz-
ards involved in accepting the null hypothesis that there
are no differences in exploitativeness between sociopaths
and normals, the weight of accumulating evidence nonethe-
less suggests that no differences in exploitativeness, or
differences of small magnitude, may exist between socio-
paths and normals. It is the responsibility of future
research to grapple with the question of whether a re-
conceptualization or abrogation of this aspect of the
concept of sociopathy is in order. Future research de-
signs should, ideally, be more reality bound and offer
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a large and clear cut advantage for exploitative behavior.
Delay of Gratification
Observational impressions of delinquents and socio-
paths suggest their inability to delay gratification.
Life styles which are characterized by lack of persist-
ence of effort, dropping out of school, poor job perfor-
mance, and lack of direction seem to provide ample evi-
dence for the sociopath's inability to delay gratification.
For delinquents, clinical observations have been consistent
with research findings. Mischel (1961) performed an in-
vestigation of delay behavior with delinquent and non-
delinquent Trinidadian Negroes aged 12 to 14. He used
three measures of delay of gratification, and found his
non-delinquents chose the delay option significantly more
frequently.
Based on Mischel 's findings and clinical descriptions
of the sociopath, hypothesis 2 stated that normal controls
would exhibit a greater preference for delayed gratifica-
tion than sociopaths. The present data support hypothesis
2 only for the NSs. The PSs demonstrated a capacity for
delay behavior equal to that of the controls. Some
support for the present finding that subgroups of a de-
linquent population are not equatable in their delay
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behavior comes frora the research of Erikson & Roberts
(1971) who worked with two groups of institutionalized
delinquent males matched for age, IQ, and length of
institutionalization. The experimental group of delin-
quents consisted of boys who had chosen to live in a
special cottage and attend public school even though this
choice was made with the understanding that it v;ould de-
lay their release from the institution. The groups were
compared on a verbal measure of delay of gratification,
as well as on measures of foresight and planning ability,
impulsiveness, internal vs. external control, and adjust-
ment ratings. To determine delaying capacity each boy
was asked the following question: "A boy won $1,000 in a
contest, what do you think he did with it?" The question
was scored on whether the money was spent immediately or
not
.
Erikson and Robert's data revealed that a signifi-
cantly greater number of the experimental group of de-
linquents responded with ansv^/ers indicating that they
would delay spending the money. The experimental group
delinquents were less impulsive and more internally
controlled than the C group, but no differences 'ftere
found in measures of foresight and planning ability or
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adjustment ratings. These findings of no group differ-
ences in measures of foresight and planning ability or
adjustment ratings are of particular interest since the
inability to delay gratification is often imputed from
the presence or absence of these very qualities. That
the groups were differentiated on behavioral and verbal
measures of delay, and not on planning, foresight and
adjustment, suggests that these variables should be kept
conceptually apart. It is possible that PSs are mis-
takenly thought to be deficient in delaying capacity
because of their poor judgment, adjustment, foresight
and planning ability. It is unfortunate that Erikson and
Roberts did not compare their experimental group of de-
linquents' verbal delay behavior against a normal control
group. It would have been instructive to see the degree
and direction of differences.
The generalizability of the findings of the present
study are limited by the present experimental constraints
Only one delay period, one week, v;as used: sociopaths
were institutionalized and controls ^-^re not- and the
incentives for a delayed choice were only roughly com-
parable for the sociopaths and controls. Future research
should consider different experim.ental situations, and
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different periods of delay and incentives for delay.
As researchers vvell know, correlation per se does
not necessarily ircply a cause and effect relationship
between variables. With this in raind, examination of the
correlates of delay behavior may, nevertheless, be help-
ful in fostering a more complete understanding of the
mechanisms of delayed gratification. A particularly
promising correlate as revealed by research has been time
orientation or future tim.e perspective. One of the
early studies demonstrating a relationship between future
time perspective and delay behavior was done by Mischel
& Metzner (1962) . Their measure of future time perspec-
tive was a series of questions pertaining to the age and
time of occurrence of certain events identified by chil-
dren aged 5 to 12. The measure of delay was a simple
choice preference under five different delay intervals,
Mischel and Metzner found that delay Ss made more m.oderate
and realistic estimates of future events, -vhereas imme-
diate Ss made either extremely short or extrem.ely long
estimates.
Having established a relationship between time ori-
entation and delayed gratification, it should follow that
delinquents should be more extreme in their time
Ill
perspective. Barndt & Johnson (1955) studied tinie orien-
tation in delinquents and non-delinquents. Their Ss
ranged in age from approximately 15 years to 17 years and
were matched on age, IQ, academic achievement, and SES.
Future time perspective was measured through the use of
stories obtained from all Ss in response to verbal instruc-
tions which included only the beginning of the story. The
stories were recorded and scored in terms of the length
of time covered by the action of the stories. The inves-
tigators found that delinquent boys produced significantly
shorter time spans for their stories. Siegman (1981),
working with delinquents and men in the Israeli army,
compared their future time perspective using a procedure
similar to that used by Mischel & Metzner (1362) . Sub-
jects were asked to name a number of events that referred
to things which they may do or which may happen to them
in the future. They were then asked to indicate v;hat age
they would be at the occurrence of each event. Future
time perspective was then determined from the ages indi-
cated. In accord with previous research, the delinquent
group obtained significantly lower future time perspec-
tive scores.
More recently, Klineberg (1963) studied future tine
perspective and preference for delayed reward, breaking
down future time perspective into three components:
"Length of time perspective" was determined by the time
span of the action in TAT stories and the median age of
Ss' predictions when asked to guess how old they would be
at the occurrence of a number of different personal
future events. "Everyday concern with future events" was
based on a measure of the proportion of references to
events in the past, present or future. "Sense of reality
of future events" was a measure designed to reflect the
degree to which the subject conceived of the future as
an orderly unfolding of events in logical and predictable
successions. Klineberg's Ss were youngsters ranging from
10 years to approximately 13 years. He used two measures
of delayed gratification, a behavioral measure and a
verbal measure. Though Klineberg did not work directly
with delinquents, he pointed out that research has shown
the delinquent to have a foreshortened perspective on
the future. He underscored the fact that this future
orientation is responsible, at least in part, for the
delinquent's impulsivity, but he also stressed that
where events are only a short time away the inability to
envision events many years av;ay should be less likely to
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be relevant. m this regard, he found no significant
relationship betv^en preference for delay behavior on both
of his measures and length of time perspective, a finding
which does not agree with Mischel & Metzner (1962)
.
Significant relationships were found between preferences
for delayed reward and more realistic and consistent out-
looks on the personal future as a whole, and greater
everyday preoccupation with future events.
Some of the questions pertaining to the relationships
of sociopathy, delay of gratification, and time orienta-
tion could undoubtedly be tied together within a research
design incorporating all these factors. Also of practical
importance would be a research project which would explore
the possibilities of increasing delay behavior in socio-
paths by changing their time orientation.
Risk Taking
Hypothesis 3 stated that sociopaths, as compared to
normals, would exhibit greater risk taking behavior. The
hypothesis was confirmed only for the PSs. The relation-
ships between NSs, PSs, and Cs in risk taking are equivocal
because of a problem of interpretation introduced by the
experimental design, the nature of wnich was elaborated
in the preceding chaptei , Briefly stated, a high risk
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Choice was effected by S's o.ior choice of i..ediate or
delayed gratification, and groups, with the exception of
the PSs and Cs, were not equatable in their in^ediate vs.
delay choices. After roughly comparing the relative pro-
portions of ss Choosing delayed gratification for the NSs
against the PSs and Cs with the nui^ber of Ss in each
group choosing high risk, it appears that the NSs fall
between the Cs and PSs in their proclivity for high risks.
The three subject groups were also coiT,pared on their
subjective perception of the degree of risk involved in
their spinning of the dial. Subjects' rating scores in-
dicated that the PSs and NSs perception of risk was the
same and that the sociopaths saw the risk involved as
significantly more favorable than did controls.
The present findings of greater risk taking and sub-
jective underestimation of risk among sociopaths are con-
sistent with those of Claster (1967)
. Claster matched a
group of delinquents and non-delinquents on age, IQ and
race. A questionnaire was administered which was con-
structed to m>easure S's perception of the risk of arrest
and conviction for the commission of hypothetical offenses.
It was found that delinquents perceived themselves to be
more imimune from arrest, but no group differences were
lis
found for perception of conviction, it is important to
note that the delinquents perceived the-r.selves as irm,une
from arrest in spite of the fact that many of the:, were
recidivists
.
HOW do we understand the sociopath's minimization of
risk? one possibility is that underestimation of risk is
related to the sociopath's poor conditionability of fear
(Hare, 1965; Lykken, 1957; Schmauk, 1970). Much of tne
recent research with sociopaths has demonstrated that
they are less anxious generally than normals, and that,
in comparison to normals, a fewer number of cues are
capable of eliciting an anxiety or fear response (Schmauk,
1970)
.
Inherent in the experience of risk is the recog-
nition of the contingency of an unfavorable outcome,
examples of which might be loss of money or being arrested
If the sociopath is less emotionally responsive to the
avers ive consequences of an unfavorable outcome of a risk
situation, he is then more likely to perceive the degree
of risk as less.
Present findings that sociopaths preferred higher
risks than Cs are consistent with the results of a
number of studies dealing with personality correlates of
risk taking. Cameron & Myers (1966) found that Ss high
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in exhibitionisit, (attention getting behavior), aggression,
and dominance tended to prefer bets with high payoff and
low probabilities of winning. Scodel and his associates
(1959) observed that low risk individuals, in a gambling
situation, were higher on measures of fear of failure and
need for achievement. Atkinson, Bastian, Earl, & Litwin
(1960)
,
in concordance with Scodel, showed that high need
for achievement college men, making imaginary bets, pre-
ferred intermediate risks over extreme risks. iVhile no
experim,ental measure of need for achievement is available
for delinquents or sociopaths, the face validity for their
being low in need for achievement is extremely strong.
This being so, their preference for high risks in the
present study is in agreement with the relationship
found by Atkinson et al. between risk taking and need for
achievement
.
Perception of Self and Others
The sociopaths and the norm.al controls did not dif-
fer from each other in their mean ratings of the other
person's intelligence, the other's cooperativeness
,
their own cooperation, and the other's consistency of
strategy choice. A comparison of the self cooperation
and other's cooperation scores showed that _Ss correctly
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perceived the other person as being more cooperative.
While groups did not differ in their overall ratings,
correlations between the degree of exploitat iveness with-
in a group and several of the ratings did show signifi-
cant relationships. Both the NSs and Cs evidenced a
significant trend for the ir.ore exploitative Ss to accu-
rately label their behavior as less cooperative than did
the low exploitative subjects. This relationship was not
found for the PSs, suggesting that PSs may either be un-
willing or unable to correctly label their exploitative
behavior.
Inverse correlations between degree of exploitative-
ness and intelligence of the other person were found for
both the NSs and Cs but not for the PSs. It appears that
for the NSs and Cs, the more exploitative Ss tended to
devalue the intelligence of the other. It seeir.s likely
that the high exploitative S^s may have considered their
partners less intelligent because they permitted them-
selves to be exploited. Weakness, or letting oneself be
taken advantage of, may be associated generally with lack
of intelligence. That PSs did not evidence a significant
relationship between degree of exploitat iveness and
other's intelligence is consistent with their not labeling
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their competitiveness as accurately. High exploitative
PSs, tending not to see themselves as exploitative, could
hardly be expected to see the other person as a victim
of exploitation.
The correlations obtained for the relationship be-
tween degree of exploitat iveness and cooperation of the
other v/ere all inverse but nonsignificant, suggesting
that there was a tendency for high exploitative S^s to
misperceive their partners behavior as uncooperative.
The mis percept ion that did occur could be understood as
a S^'s defense against admitting that he was exploitative
without provocation. Projecting uncooperat iveness onto
the other serves as a rationalization for one's own lack
of cooperation. This finding of high exploitative Ss
perceiving their partners as uncooperative could also be
the result of the high exploitative S^s ' general devaluing
of the overall ^^«Drth of their partner, and this being re-
flected, as a negative halo effect, m the rating scores
for cooperation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it appears that the well accepted
clinical doctrine of a strong association between socio-
pathy and egocentricity demands reexamination. Results
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of the present study suggest that there are little or no
differences betv^en normals and sociopaths in egocentric
behavior. Support for this position is found in the work
of Berger & Tedeschi (1989) and of Sutker (1970)
.
As regards the capacity to delay gratification, un-
expected differences v;ere found between the neurotic and
primary sociopaths, primary sociopaths tending to delay
gratification more frequently than the neurotic sociopaths
Surprisingly, the delay behavior of the normals and pri-
mary sociopaths was similar. This is particularly
puzzling when one considers the life styles of socio-
paths involved in the study. All had exhibited behavior
which is generally associated with an incapacity to
delay gratification. All sociopaths were criminal offen-
ders and recidivists. It is generally taken for granted
that the inability to follow a life plan or work pro-
ductively is synonoraous with poor delaying capacity. The
results of the present study suggest that this may not be
so, or that the relationships between these variables is
more complicated than is presently thought, or that the
experimental measure of delay of gratification was un-
reliable .
While PSs v/ere more like normals in their delay
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behavior than v;ere NSs, this relationship was reversed
for risk taking behavior. Primary sociopaths were
clearly more attracted to high risk contingencies than
were normals, and the neurotic sociopaths inclination
to take high risks seemed to fall in-betv.-een these two
groups
.
Reserving final judgment on the outcome of future
research, present results and those of other studies
suggest that a reconceptualization of the concept of
sociopathy may be necessary. One area of investigation
which appears promising is the further exploration of
the differences between neurotic and primary sociopaths.
Egocentricity, Delay of Gratification, and Risk
Taking in Sociopaths. (March 1972)
Sheiaon D. Gluck, B.S., City College of the City University
of New York
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Larry C. Kerpelman
The acceptance of the diagnostic category of socio-
pathy has been based nearly exclusively on clinical ob-
servation. A number of research studies nave been con-
ducted which have focused on anxiety and avoidance
learning in the sociopath, but few studies have put other
of the putative criteria of scciopathy under the experi-
mental spotlight. It was the purpose of this study to
help close this investigative gap and to experimentally
examine three criteria of sociopathy , ~ two of which
-^ere
based on descriptions provided in the writings of Hervey
Cleckley (1964) , and the third of which was based on
common sense impressions of the sociopath's life style.
They were: egocentricity, experimentally phrased as
exploitativeness; inability to delay gratification; and
high risk taking.
Sociopaths were recruited from a reformatory
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population, and noriral controls were recruited fron,
Philadelphia high schools. There were 35 primary socio-
paths (P3S), 35 neurotic sociopaths (nSs)
, and 35 controls
(Cs). Beyond the obvious distinction of criminal incar-
ceration, Ss were assigned to their respective groups
based on their MMPI profiles and Taylor Manifest Anxiety
Scores (^LAS)
.
Primary and neurotic sociopaths ^^re
characterized by Pd-Ma profiles, with the neurotic socio-
paths generally scoring higher on the anxiety scales:
hypochondriasis, depression, hysteria, and psychasthenia.
The NSs were also selected to have higher f^lAS scores. An
attempt was made to match groups for age, funds available,
race, IQ, and socioeconomic status.
Three major hypotheses were presented, it was pre-
dicted that sociopaths, as compared with controls, would
exhibit greater exploitat iveness
, less capacity to delay
gratification, and higher risk taking behavior.
The experimental procedure can be thought of as
divided into four stages, three associated with measuring
the criteria under investigation, and the fourth with
the administration of a post-experimental rating form and
questionnaire.
For the first phase of the experiment, all Ss
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participated m a Prisoner's Dileirtma (PD) gaine
. They ^^re
led to believe that they
-were playing with a partner, but
in reality no partner was present, and all Ss played
against a lOCPA unconditional cooperative strategy. Rather
than playing for a constant number of trials, Ss played
the game until an upper limit of $3.00 was approximated.
The proportion of exploitative choices was the dependent
measure
.
For the second phase, Ss were given the option of
receiving their earnings immediately, or of receiving them
a week later with a $1.00 bonus (for inmates, earnings
were redeemable in canteen m.erchandise)
.
In part three of the study, S^s were given a chance
to increase their earnings by spinning a dial with the
numbers one to five on it. The odds involved were ex-
plained and the contingencies for a win or loss made
clear
.
Finally, a rating form, asking for valuations of the
partner's intelligence, own and other's cooperation, and
other's consistency of choice, was administered along
with a questionnaire giving the an opportunity to ex-
press his reasons for his particular decisions.
Predictions concerning exploitat iveness were not
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supported, on a number of measures of exploitativeness
obtained within the context of the PD, sociopaths ex-
hibited sir.all margins of exploitativeness. There .vere,
however, no significant differences between the three
groups on any of the rr,easures. In the light of relevant
research, these findings were taken to indicate that
there is not a strong association between egocentricity
and sociopathy. Implications for future research focused
on the desirability of using more reality bound experi-
mental situations to test this reputed characteristic of
sociopaths
.
The data for delaying gratification supported hypoth-
esis 2 only in part. As anticipated, NSs exhibited less
delaying
-apacity than Cs, but, unexpectedly, PSs ex-
hibited preferences for delayed gratification equal to
that of the Cs, This finding was discussed with regard
to the limits of its generalizability and possible
directions for continued research. The importance of
varying delay intervals and incentives for delay was
stressed.
The results for risk taking did not allow for easy
interpretation because of a '-'^akness in the experimental
design. Primary sociopaths did exhibit significantly
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greater risk taking than Cs but the relationships for NSs
and the other two groups were less clear. Essentially,
based on post hoc examination of the data and the fact
that sociopaths rated their perception of risk as nore
favorable than Cs, it was concluded that sociopaths
underestimate degree of risk and exhibit a preference
for higher risks.
No differences were found between groups on mean
rating scores for intelligence of the other person,
cooperation of the other person, cooperation of self,
and the other's consistency, but differences 'vere
found between groups for the degree of exploitat iveness
and rating scores.
The findings of the present study raise doubt as to
the general validity of the traditional conceptions of
sociopathy. Dividing the disorder into two subtypes was
shown to be m^eaningful, and the importance of further
research was em.phasized.
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APPENDIX A
Experimental Instructions
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INSTRUCTIONS
It is part of the experiment that you do not know
Who your partner is. Do not speak during the experiment
and do not try to find out who your partner is.
This experiment is being run under the direction of
the University of Massachusetts. Nothing you do during
the experiment will be reported to (the name of the
agency goes here)
.
The purpose of this experiment is to study decision
making where your decision has an effect on the other
person as well as yourself.
There are two of you who are going to make a series
of decisions. The decisions you make will determine how
much money you make
.
This is what each of you will do. You see in front
of you a red card and a blue card. Each time that light
in front of you goes on you will pick either the red or
blue card and you v/ill pass the card to m.e through the
slot in the partition. It will help to make things clear
if you look at the chart posted in front of you.
Notice that if you pick the red card two things can
happen. If you pick red and the other person also picks
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red, you get 10^ and he gets 10^. if you pick red and
he picks the blue card, you get 5^ and he gets 15>z^.
Suppose you pick the blue card, again two things can
happen, if you pick blue and the other person also picks
blue, you get 3^' and ne gets 2^. if you pick blue and he
picks red you get 15jzf and he gets 5;2f.
You will keep all the money you make. You won't
get money after each trial but I will keep track of how
much you have made. At the end of the experiment you
will receive (scrip; a canteen slip, s is shown scrip;
canteen slip.) showing the amount of money you earned.
You will give this to (one of the secretaries; the canteen)
who will give you your (money; canteen)
.
The experiment will continue for approximately
twenty minutes. O.K. now ^ve are ready to begin. When
you see that light in front of you go on it means that
both of you are to pick the red or blue card. Once you
have made your cnoice put the card through the slot in
the partition. After a few seconds you will receive a
card telling you how much money you have made. The red
or blue card will be returned to you at this point. ^«Vhen
you have seen how mucn you have made on the payoff card
return it to me through the slot and get ready for the
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next trial. You will be told every few trials how :.uch
total money you have made.
(The Ss played the game)
Now I'm going to give you a chance to increase your
earnings. I'm going to ask you to make a choice on
whether you would like the money you have earned today
or a week from today. If you like, you can have your
money immediately after the experin^ent is over; or if
you wait a ^veek I will add a one dollar bonus to the
amount you earned today. Indicate your preference by
checking the appropriate box on that slip of paper and
pass the slip through the slot in the partition.
(At this juncture a new matrix was introduced)
Please note the new amounts of money involved.
(The game was played for one trial)
(The _S was now seen in a different room)
Now I'm going to give you another chance to increase
your earnings. (Dial is presented.) If you want you may
spin the dial only once. If you get a "5" I will pay
you $15. If you do not get a "5" you will lose all that
you earned up to now (If gets a $1.00 bonus he keeps
that). The odds are 4 to 1 against getting a "5." What
v/ould you like to do?
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(After the S n^ade his choice he received a rating
form and a questionnaire to fill out)
.
APPEMDIX B
Rating Forin
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I would like you to rate the other person's in-
telliqence (how smart or bright you think he is)
,
cooperation (how willing he was to make choices that
would allow both of you to earn equal amounts of noney,
and not try to earn more than you)
, and consistency (how
often he made the same choice on each trial)
.
Place a check mark above the number that gives the
rating you want to make. For example, if you feel that
your partner is very intelligent, you would place a check
above the number "7." if you feel that your partner is
not intelligent, you would place a check mark above the
number "1." if you feel he is average, you would place
a check above the number "4."
Place your check marks above, not between, the
numbers
.
INTELLIGENCE
(How smart or bright you think he is)
^^ot Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Intelligent
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COOPERATION
(HOW willing he was to i.ake choices that would allow bothOf you to earn equal a,.ounts of xnoney. and not try toearn more than you) ^
Very Cooperative 12 3 4 5 6 7 Not Cooperative
(How willing you '^re to r.ake choices that would allowboth of you to earn equal amounts of money, and not t^vto earn more than him)
Not Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6_7 Very Cooperative
CONSISTENCY
(How often he made the same choice on each trial
Very Consistent 12 3 4 5 6 7 Not Consistent
APPENDIX C
Questionnaire Form
141
I would like you to ans^ver the questions below in your
own words.
a) What ^vere you trying to do in the decision making
situation with the other person?
b) VJhat did you think the other person was doing in the
decision making situation?
c) What made you take your money today; what made you
wait a week for your money?
d) What made you decide to spin the dial; what decided
you against spinning the dial?
e) What did you think your chances of getting a "5" on
the dial were?
(Check one.)
Excellent Good Fair Not Good Bad
APPENDIX D
Analyses of Variance
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TABLE 22
Summary of Analyses of Variance for Group Matching
Variables: Age, IQ, SES, and Funds
Source of Variation df 3S MS F R
Age
Between Groups 2 244. 353 122.177 49.930 .01
Within Groups 102 249. 560 2.447
Total 104 493
. 953
IQ
Between Groups 2 180. 348 90.174 .786 n
Within Groups 102 11704. 900 114.754
Total 104 11885. 245
SES
Between Groups 2 110. 867 55.434 .167 n
Within Groups 102 33946. 801 332. S12
Total 104 34057. 670
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TABLE 22 (contd.)
Funds
Between Groups 2 183.985 91.992 4.218 .025
Within Groups 102 2224.715 21.811
Total 104 2408.700
Note.—All significance levels are less than the p
values indicated, £ >.io indicated by the letter n.
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TABLE 23
SuiToiiary of Analyses of Variance for
mPI-Basad Variables
Source of Variation df SS MS
L Scale
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
2 10.413 5.207 1.136 n
102 467.428 4.583
104 477.841
F Scale
2 137.192 68.600 6.310 .01
102 1108.854 10.371
104 1246.046
K Scale
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
2
102
104
258.370 129.435 9.350 .01
1340.453 13.142
1599.323
TABLE 23 (contd.)
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Hs Scale
Between Groups 2 249.726 124.863 18.455 .01
Within Groups 102 690.112 6.766
Total 104 939.837
D Scale
Between Groups 2 425.846 212.923 19.S62 .01
Within Groups 102 1087.996 10.667
Total 104 1513.842
Hy Scale
Between Groups 2 701.536 350.768 33.522 .01
Within Groups 102 1067.309 10.464
Total 104 1768.345
Pd Scale
Between Groups 2 2005.723 1002. S62 127.103 .01
Within Groups 102 804.797 7.390
Total 104 2810.521
TABLE 23 (contd.)
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Mf Scale
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
2 62.524 31.262 1.551 n
102 2055.710 20.154
104 2118.233
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Pa Scale
2 120.925 60.462 9.442
.01
102 653.198
104 774.123
6.404
Pt Scale
2 515.093 257.549 22.313 .01
102 1177.083 11.540
104 1692.181
Between Grouos
Within GrouDs
Sc Scale
66. 123
102 1472.050
33.061 2.291 n
14.432
Total 104 1538.173
TABLE 23 (contd.)
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Ma Scale
Betv^een Groups 2 360.809 180.405 21.870
.01
Within Groups 102 841.427 8.249
'^ot^l 104 1202.236
Si Scale
Bet^veen Groups 2 722.496 361. 248 8.567 .01
Within Groups IQ2 4301.301 42.170
Total 104 5023.797
Total Anxiety Score
Between Groups 2 34390.801 17195.398 59.830 .01
Within Groups 102 29315.250 287.404
Total 104 63706.051
Manifest Anxiety Score
Between Groups 2 1849.208 924.604 46.091 .01
Within Groups 102 2046.171 20.061
Total 104 3S95.380
Note.—All significance levels are less than the £
values indicated. _d >.1G is indicated by the letter

